● 668

/For details of Communist policies toward various sociological, political, and economic aspects of present-day Southwest China, see the entire text in category 116./

175 mutual suspicion and disdain. When many of the
186 new factories and the modern, urbanized immigrants
563 who largely ran them moved back to the
more convenient locations and amenities of the
eastern industrial centers after the war, their
departure was mourned by few of the older population
178 of Chungking. Some of the factories remained
in operation, however, and the wartime exploration
of the mineral resources of the Southwestern
provinces contributed not only new knowledge of
the potential economic value of the Southwest but
also impelling reasons for its further development
and for tying it closer to the rest of China
by improved communications.

The intellectual impact may have made
177 a deeper, longer lasting impression on the people
of the Southwest, simply because many of the students
and older intellectuals were intensely desirous
in their patriotic and socially idealistic zeal
of establishing closer contacts with the masses
of the people and contributing to their improved
welfare and national consciousness. Likewise,
most of the intellectuals in the rural education
movement were devoted to improving the livelihood
and educational level of the peasants. These
rural teachers were fully conscious that if they
attained their objective it would engender popular
demands on the government for improved social
conditions and more democratic, responsible
political organization.

668 Both the organized rural education movement
and the sporadic efforts of inspired students
and professional people were handicapped by

68 government wartime censorship and control which permitted no criticism of existing conditions or of government policies and personnel. The revolutionary, political, economic, and social elements of the Kuomintang peogram which had won the party a popular following and control of the national government in the mid-1920's had been repudiated under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership and replaced with a reworked Confucian doctrine that sanctioned authoritarian rule.[36] As a result, the spread of Kuomintang influence in the Southwest Region and the recruitment there of members to the Party and its auxiliary San-min Chu-i Youth Corps served to disseminate the principles and influences of authoritarian rule rather than to stir up the social ferment which had accompanied the Kuomintang's rise to power at Nanking a decade earlier. At the same time, the government found it expedient to permit local warlords to maintain their control and oppression of the people without interference as long as assigned quotas for grain payment and army inductees were met.

In the last year of World War II, popular dissatisfaction with Nationalist Government control and policies was plainly manifested in the Southwest Region as elsewhere in China by outbreaks of rebellions and anti-government demonstrations. They

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[36] See Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: the Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology," The Far Eastern Quarterly, August 1955.

668 were evidently inspired by economic rather than political factors. Enemy bombings and infantry drives against economic objectives, inflation, heavy taxes, and forced delivery of grain quotas to the government at prices far below the open market rate drove farmers and townspeople into bankruptcy, starvation, and desperate measures. After the war, the Nationalist Government was preoccupied with containing or eliminating the Communists while restoring its position in the agriculturally and industrially wealthier, more developed regions of North, Central-South, East and Northeast China. The Southwest was left more to its own devices and the rule of local warlords than was originally planned by the central authorities.

IV. THE RISE AND VICTORY OF COMMUNISM

A. The Long March

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669 Before the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, Communism had had a more fleeting existence in Southwest China than in any other region of China. The only period of considerable Communist activity in the Southwest prior to the autumn of 1949 was at the time of the circuitous Long March. The six thousand-mile trek was a Communist retreat from areas of strength in Kiangsi and Fukien to Shensi under constant pressure from Kuomintang air and ground forces.

The first Communist migration occurred in 1933 when Nationalist Government attacks on the

668 soviets in the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei border area forced a partial withdrawal of the Communist
669 troops there to Szechwan.[37] They were able to hold on to the naturally defensible northwest corner of the province, and this became the initial goal of the main forces of the Chinese soviets when they were forced to leave their bases in Kiangsi and Fukien under the sledge hammer blows of the Fifth Campaign launched by Chiang Kai-shek in October 1934. The line of retreat for the main body passed through Kweichow, Yunnan, and eastern Sikang.

In these provinces and in Szechwan, the Communists undertook propaganda activities among the Chinese and tribal peoples to gain their good will for the passage of the retreating column of soldiers and civilians. Such acts as the furnishing of arms to the Lolo tribesmen of southwestern Szechwan and eastern Sikang and the distribution of excess captured food supplies to the Chinese peasants all along the route of march helped ease the Communists' way into the Sung-p'an area of Szechwan in July 1935.

While the spent ranks of the new arrivals paused to regain their strength, the Communist leaders argued out future strategy. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai from the Kiangsi-Fukien soviets insisted that the march be resumed with Shensi as the objective. The leaders of the former Hunan-

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[37] On the Communist retreat through the Southwest Region see Snow, op. cit., pp.178-194.

668 Hupeh-Anhwei force, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Hsü
669 Hsiang-ch'ien, favored remaining at the Szechwan base. Evidently the difference was bound up with a continuing power struggle and could not be resolved. In late August, the main force under Mao and Chou struck north into Shensi. Chang and Hsü with their contingent did not follow until a year later, and then only when driven out of Szechwan by Chiang Kaï-shek's armies.

From 1936 until the Red Army invaded the Southwest in 1949, no large-scale Communist movement showed itself in the wartime stronghold of the Nationalist Government. However, a small number of official Communist representatives led by Chou En-lai were stationed at Chungking to maintain liaison with the Kuomintang in the uneasy and mutually expedient alliance between the two armed parties of China during the war of resistance against Japan.

B. Personalities with the Communist Regime

Although the Southwest experienced Communism only briefly before 1949, some of the top men in the Communist regime today derived from Szechwan. Three early converts to Communism from Szechwan are military men -- Chu Teh, Liu Po-ch'eng, and Ch'en I.

The best known and most remarkable of the trio is Chu Teh.[38] Born into a wealthy family,

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[38] Ibid., pp. 346-55.

[redacted]

669 he was early trained in Western military science
668 and accustomed to luxury and the opium habit. After distinguishing himself as one of Ts'ai Ao's leading generals in 1911 and 1915-16, Chu fell back into the indolent, corrupt life of a warlord-bureaucrat in Yunnan until his habit of reading stirred him into beginning a new life in his late thirties. Forsaking his family and position in Chungking, he broke himself of opium addiction, came under the influence of young leftists and Communists in Shanghai, and travelled and studied in Germany, France, and Moscow before returning to China in 1925. Caught up in the Nationalist Revolution then rising to flood stage, Chu became a full-fledged Communist in 1927 when the split in the Kuomintang-Communist alliance faced him with choosing one side or the other. From 1928 when he joined his forces with those of Mao Tse-tung on the Kiangsi-Hunan border until the end of the Long March in Shensi some seven years later, Chu Teh became a legendary figure in China and in the annals of defensive-guerrilla tactics. Since 1931 he has been commander of the Communist armies, and is now one of the most honored "old comrades" of the Party.

Both Ch'en I and Liu Po-ch'eng joined the Communist Party before Chu Teh, but they did not begin to distinguish themselves until the war of resistance against Japan. Ch'en led the New Fourth Army in the Yangtze River area, while Liu headed the 129th division of the Eighth Route Army in the North China Region. During

669 the civil war that followed almost immediately 668 upon Japan's surrender, Ch'en I rose to the position of commander of the Third Field Army and Liu Po-ch'eng was promoted to the command of the Second Field Army. The two armies were responsible for the campaigns in the East and Central-South regions, and the Second Army carried the brunt of the attack on the Southwest Region. Ch'en I became a major figure in the East China Region after the Communist victory, and Liu Po-ch'eng assumed various positions of military and civilian leadership in Southwest China.

Another native of Szechwan, Kuo Mo-jo, is one of the leading figures of modern, pre-Communist Chinese literature, journalism, and scholarship. Not a member of the Communist Party as far as is known, Kuo has been heaped with honors by the Communist regime, allowed to travel extensively outside China, and given numerous official positions in the regime's cultural and literary organizations. Originally an advocate of art for art's sake, he became gradually more socially conscious and radical in his literary and journalistic work. Forced to flee to Japan because of his leftist political ideas, he added serious studies in Chinese archeology and ancient history to his long list of writings in poetry, fiction, and political-social polemics.

C. Postwar Victory

By the time the Communist forces entered the Southwest Region in strength, the rest of the Mainland had been overrun and the Communist

669 regime formally established in Peking.[39] It
668 was November before the Second Field Army under Liu Po-ch'eng launched an attack on Kweichow, taking the provincial capital at Kweiyang on November 15. Chungking in Szechwan fell to the Second Field Army on the last day of the month. During the next few weeks, Liu's forces moved westward toward Chengtu while the Fourth Field Army struck into Szechwan from the north. After Chengtu fell December 27, many of the remaining organized Kuomintang forces surrendered to the Communists in Yunnan and Sikang, and the Communists officially claimed the complete "liberation" of the Southwest Region. However, it is clear that large-scale unorganized resistance continued for a good part of 1950, and isolated bands undoubtedly held out much longer in the rugged mountain areas of the Southwest. It is
636 doubtful, too, whether the Communists have any more real control than had former regimes over the semi-independent tribal areas of the Southwest, especially along its borders with Indo-China and Burma.

669 The lack of any prolonged organized resistance in the naturally defensible areas of the Southwest Region was the result of several factors. Little faith in the Kuomintang cause remained

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[39] The names, dates, and campaigns connected with the Communist victory are largely taken from a Communist source, which is accurate in regard to these facts as far as can be determined by checking against other scattered sources: Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1954, pp. 108-09.

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[redacted]

669 among the Nationalist armies and the Chinese
668 people left in the Southwest region. The best Kuomintang troops that could be salvaged from the Communist avalanche had already been withdrawn with the government and its leading officials to Formosa. Other nationalist armed forces retreated into Burma under Li Mi and Yü Ch'eng-wan, living off the Burmese countryside and making occasional harrassing raids into Southwest China for several years until withdrawn to Formosa. Many of the troops and their leaders who surrendered wholesale to the Communists in the Southwest provinces were warlord elements which never had had any commitment, let alone loyalty, to the Nationalist Government.

For the tribal people, the advent of the Communists meant only a change in rulers, with no guarantee that the new overlords would be any more upright or considerate in their dealings with the unassimilated peoples than had been the old Nationalist bureaucracy. The Chinese people of the region were thoroughly sick of warlord exploitation and Nationalist Government corruption. Any regime that promised peace and stability would have been welcomed. To the great majority of the Southwest's population, the peasants, the struggle for power was none of their business. They stood aside waiting for the winner to emerge, and accepted the victory of the Red Army as the beginning of a new dynasty which had inherited the "mandate of heaven" from the discredited Kuomintang.

178 in the new business or political hierarchy and
565 yet were unwilling to return to their home villages.
They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it.

178 Influenced by the idea of democracy which
565 they had discovered in the new schools, the in-
668 tellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of the revolutionary Kuomintang and Communist leaders in China shows that the majority of them came from the middle-class, landowning, and merchant families, and had attended modern schools.[12] The labor unions, the peasants' associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new career.

178 During this period of social and political
701 disorder, military men began to gain power, ob-
874
555 taining offices by virtue of their military success.
565 Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampoa) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaigns

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[12] Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-21.

178 against the warlords. In the war against Japan
701 the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced.
874 A military career has now become a major
555 attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible
565 channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their prestige to their military skill, suggest the reputation acquired by military men in the modern period.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

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668 ● The Chinese Communists, like Communists elsewhere, claim adherence to orthodoz Marxist teachings. They analyze the existing social structure in China in terms of the theory of class struggle and insist on the inevitability of a classless society. In the name of evolving toward this state they justify the liquidation of certain segments of the Chinese population "which stand in the way of the regime." Doing so, they cause changes in the social structure of China.

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949), Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the People, and those who were to enjoy all the rights of the People. In the first group were included

565 the Kuomintang leader Chiang-Kai-shek, "bureau-
668 cratic capitalists" like H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, "feudalistic" landlords, and a host of other anti-Communist leaders. The second group consisted of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeois, and the national bourgeois. Workers were considered the elite of the nation; the peasant were to be converted into rural workers through collectivization of agriculture, or into urban workers through the development of industry; the petty bourgeois were needed during the "New Democratic Stage" and were to be "re-educated" in the process of reconstruction; and the national bourgeois, once "enslaved: by bureaucratic capitalism, were now "free" to contribute to the industrialization of China. Mao's classification of the Chinese population and his stipulation of the task of each class at the "New Democratic Stage" formed the conceptual basis from 1949 to 1954 for the Communist policy toward each of the classes.

The convocation of the National People's Congress in 1954 is considered by the Chinese Communists to have marked the conclusion of the "New Democratic Stage: and the beginning of a transitional period which will lead China to socialism. Land reform had been completed and the landlords as a class eliminated, the wings of the bourgeois industrialists, and merchants, had been clipped by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and the "ideology of the working class" had been officially established as the ideology for all sectors of China.

B. The New Social Ladder

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668 The Chinese Communists distinguish between persons "from the working class" and those "possessing the ideology of the working class." The Party acknowledges that not all Communists are from the working class but those who have accepted its ideology belong to it. By the same logic, the working-class character of the People's Liberation Army is fixed. The Communists says that, since the People's Liberation Army is led by the working class, viz., the Communist Party, although the bulk of the soldiers and commanders may not be from the working class, the army remains of the working class. Conversely, many workers may not possess the ideology of the working class. The Communists explain that most of the Chinese workers are fresh from the villages where "feudalistic ideas" abound and have not had time to develop the ideology of the working class.

The classification of people according to the ideology they profess is one of the underlying principles governing the activities of the Communist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the labor unions, rural organizations such as the peasants' associations, mutual-aid teams, and co-operatives, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology.

668 596 Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally through the promotion and supervision of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, encourages women to leave the confines of the family. The recruitment of candidates for institutions of higher learning and the assignment of jobs to graduates when they have completed their education also serve to uproot the individual from his immediate environment and make him dependent for advancement on the Communist regime. The weakening of family loyalty forces the indvidual to look toward the mass organizations sponsored by the Communists, who regard the Party itself as a desirable substitute 668 for the traditional social structure. Since the 555 individual relies on mass organizations for political advancement, which is the prerequisite for economic and social betterment, the mass organizations are most important for the stabilization of society under the current regime. The regime exercises the power to control the career expectancies of the members of mass organization reward the achievement of those who work for the goals of the Party leadership, and punish with ostracism or more severe penalties those who rebel against the order. For the first time since the abolition of the imperial examination system, a main channel of social advancement makes conformity the criteria of success. This state of affairs resembles, to some extent, that which prevailed in monarchical times when the mastery of dogmas contained in the Classics and their

668 commentaries was the prerequisite to success in
555 the imperial examinations.

The Communist regime found it necessary to promote as replacements for the old ruling group Communist-reformed and Communist-trained administrative, technical, and scientific personnel. Compared with the traditional social mobility, the new social mobility under the Communist regime does not spring from ideals embodied in Chinese culture but from expedient manipulation by the Communist Party.

In the development of industry, waterway and irrigation projects, the settlement of the Northwest, and the nationalization and collectivization of many enterprises, positions conceivably may be offered to absorb a good portion of the ambitious younger generation. If social mobility continues to depend on Party loyalty, purges may be used to secure loyalty, to provide a flow of scapegoats for the grievances which accumulate under a totalitarian system, and to furnish opportunities for advancement for the coming generation, whose continued devotion to the regime is crucial to its survival. But to date in Southwest China the purge of local cadres and officials at the regional level has been mainly limited to the elimination of "old social elements" rather than to the "revolutionaries" themselves.[13]

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[13] Consult the chapter on Political Dynamics in this handbook.

871 offered to a broader segment of the population in
178 the decade before World War II. New social,
596 political, and economic ideas thus disseminated
were supplemented by the outpourings of the press.
489 Some rural villages formerly a day's journey or
596 more away from the nearest great city were
178 brought only hours away by modern methods of
transportation, particularly the railroad and the steamship. All these media brought the people and especially the young into contact with ideas and way of life alien to their own. Awareness of new opportunities, comforts, and pleasures to be had in the modern city planted a seed of dissatisfaction with the old manner of living.

C. Influence of Revolutionary Thought

668 An even more disturbing influence on the
178 old way of life was the increasing spread of revo-
596 lutionary social and political doctrines after
1916. The monarchical reformer K'ang Yu-wei had brought the traditional family under attack as early as 1898 by castigating the "virtues" associated with it as either non-existent or harmful to society. These ideas did not achieve any widespread currency in China until the rise of the New Culture Movement in 1916, a revolution in Chinese thought and expression. It emphasized individualism, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of service and loyalty to the nation. Ideas of this sort were spread by the May Fourth Movement of 1919, in the revolutionary propaganda of the Kuomintang during its struggle for power in the mid-twenties, by the student of anti-Japanese agitation of the thirties, and in the socially concious writings of China's new and popular authors.

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of marriage...based on the superiority of man over woman, and the putting into effect...of monogamy, and equal rights for both sexes.

(3)...The abolition of the feudal system of marriage which neglects the interests of the children, and the putting into effect of the New Democratic system of marriage, which protects the lawful interests of women and children.[11]

In propagandizing and implementing the Marriage Law, the regime struck hard against the old authoritarianism of the family head, child marriage, mistreatment of women and discrimination against them as inferior to men, and the mistreatment of children by parents. Wives, especially wives of arranged marriages, were encouraged to seek divorce from intolerant, unrepentent husbands. However, if husbands could be made to adopt the new attitude toward women, partners of arranged marriages were urged to remain united.

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To help traditionally-minded families

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9. See comment by the American editors of Current Background, Hong Kong, American Consulate, 236, pp. 1-3; hereafter cited as C.B.: Unless editorial comment is indicated, as here, citations from Current Background refer to literal translations of material in Communist magazines and newspapers, and should be evaluated accordingly.

10. See comment of American editors of C.B., 136, p. 3.

11. "Document 7," C.B., 236, pp. 22-29.

596 attain the new Communist-established goal of
468 "democracy" and "harmony," family "struggle" meetings were arranged under cadre supervision. Each member was pressed to confess his own past sins and to help other family members to remember theirs. The particular transgressions sought out for exposure, condemnation, redress, and rectification were the mistreatment and beating of wives by husbands, similar behavior by mothers-in-law against daughters-in-law, and interference by parents in their children's free choice of marriage partners. Much was made in the Communist press of the suicides or murder of women and young people, attributed to "the old feudal system of marriage." [12]

Whatever the humanitarian by-products, the Marriage Law aimed at a basic change in Chinese society with two utilitarian purposes in view. One was to change the popular basis of loyalty from the family to the state. The other was to free the Chinese woman from her preoccupation with the home and children so that she might become a laborer in the field and factory. These aims were quite openly expressed. For instance, an article in the Peking Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao [China Youth] on the correct attitude toward parents, asserts that under the Confucian system with its emphasis on filial piety, parents had the right to regard their children as private property and demand sacrifices from them. Under the new regime, the article pointed out, "children are not the private property of their parents, but belong first of all to the state and to the people, and...the interests of the people

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12. [see next page]

596 should be the highest criterion governing our
668 actions toward our parents." [13]

An editorial in the People's Daily in March 1955 notes that remnant feudal ideologies still obstructed "the participation of women in Socialist construction and various political activities." The editorial then goes on to state that it is in order to promote the political and production zeal of women that their rights must be promoted and protected and the Marriage Law implemented.[14] Various comments on the Marriage Law inspired by the regime stress Lenin's dictum that sex relationships and family problems are not individual or small affairs but matters of great social, economic, and political significance.[15]

B. Implementation of the Marriage Law

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596 As the Nationalist government had made no attempt to put into effect the marriage and family provisions of its 1930-31 codes among the rural population, the spirit and provisions of the Marriag Law were new and alien to this great majority of the Chinese people. They were still bound to the traditional family and had not

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[12] See especially C.B., 273, pp.1-3; pp.4-14 and Survey of the China Mainland Press, Hong Kong American Consulate, 932, iv; hereafter cited as S.C.M.P. The same conditions apply to this source as to Current Background; see footnote 8.

[13] SCMP, 973, p. 31.

[14] Ibid., 106, p. 15.

[15] See, for instance, C.B., p. 4; and SCMP, 104 pp. 30-31.

II. THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNISM

114 668 In discussing Communist efforts to alter the Chinese way of life, it should be stressed that our material is unsatisfactory. Statistics, declarations, news releases give few realistic details of life in the villages under Communist domination, and most refugees from Communist China have come from the cities.

241 668 First of all, the farmer's annual routine is basically unchanged. Pilot collectives are in operation, but these are few and have no immediate bearing on the farmer's work year. The most striking change in the farmer's life is the new network of associations which the government has imposed upon him and the daily barrage of advice and exhortation to which he is subjected. No longer does he cultivate his land in the manner of his ancestors with the assistance of his family, his clan, and his neighbors. He no longer sets the periods of work and of rest. The Communist leadership is determined that the peasant shall be transformed in three ways: (1) he must be made to produce more; (2) he must become a politically conscious, active supporter of the Communist regime, and (3) his attitudes and values must be radically changed.

668 The instrument of this transformation, which is visible and active in the villages, is the Party cadre. Party cadres act as the eyes, the ears, and the mouths of authority.[15] "They are called upon to take the leadership in organizing production and to participate in all types of farm work, such as mobilizing the peasants for cultivation, teaching new farming methods, distributing new seed, performing grain requisitioning, helping in planting, building and repairing dikes, etc."[16] The village cadres have been mainly outsiders, "foreigners," but the Party has recently been recruiting youths from specific localities as well as from among the ethnic minorities and training them to return to their native places as cadres. The cadre was the instrument of land redistribution and brought into the countryside the first major change decreed by Peking. The cadre organized the Peasants' Association in the village and manipulated its meetings and its officers. It was the cadre who worked up sentiment and organized the "speak bitterness" meetings in

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[15] Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Harvard, Russian Research Center, 1952, p. 25.

[16] Ibid., p. 28.

668 the days of the Land Reform Movement -- occasions used to the full to attack the old familial order in the villages. It is the cadre who organizes the "struggle meetings" in which villagers are made to engage in criticism and self-criticism in order to undermine the old values and instill the new. It is the cadre in the Southwest who brings to each locality the new policies for the various ethnic minorities.

The cadres also pushed the organization of "mutual-aid teams" for the sharing of labor and equipment, an effort that struck at the familial organization of farm labor and apparently met with serious difficulities.[17] More recently the cadre has been the instrument for the concerted attempt to build producer co-operatives inthe countryside. In such major efforts as the attempt to put Hunan rice farming on a two-crop basis (hitherto only done further south), the cadres were reportedly responsible for training 100,000 farmers.[18]

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[17] W. W. Rostow, The Prospects of Communist China, Cambridge, 1954, p. 84.

[18] Reported by New China News Agency, Changsha, April 20, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), 1036, April 28, 1955.

668 The cadre carries on the continuing effort to destroy traditional mores, which are prime resistants in what the Communist call the long and difficult process of ideological and social reform. He publicizes the new marriage law, discourages or prevents arranged marriages, lectures on sanitation, and, sometimes with the help of radio, films, and mobile theatrical units, dramatizes the issues of the day, the need for the farmer to sacrifice, to send his sons to the army, to contribute labor to community projects, to inform on his neighbors, to buy bonds, and so forth. The cadre establishes "winter schools" in which the peasants are given intensive political indoctrination, practical training, and instruction in reading and writing. Hunan reported that 2,500,000 peasants were enrolled in these schools in the winter of 1955.[19]

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668 The age-old drive of the vigorous peasant to increase his family's land holdings is checked by fear lest he be re-classified as a "rich peasant" and be subject to higher taxes and other pressures. Yet what the Communists deplore as the peasant's "spontaneous capitalistic tendency" has not been crushed,

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[19] People's Daily, Jan. 30, 1955; SCMP 984, pp. 30-31.

556 668 and the landholdings of the more enterprising grow in size.[20]

The effort to force various forms of co-operative work has not been completely successful:

> "...when a serious team-use of labor, tools, and farm animals was attempted, a variety of unsatisfactory results emerged; quarrels among the families interfered with efficient output; no one assumed responsibility for the upkeep of communal property; the claims of inefficient members violated the sense of equity of the more efficient..."[21]

668 Yet the villagers' way of life has been greatly altered by the intervention of the government, through the cadres, in all social, economic, and political activities. The pressure to conform, at least outwardly, is formidable. Self-chosen leisure-time activities are few, meetings occupy a great deal of time, and attendance at harangues by Party cadres, entertainment furnished by traveling theatrical groups (all with their ideological message) take more of his leisure. The slack winter season may now find him in winter school or

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[20] Rostow, op. cit., p. 152, cites the Peking People's Daily, Feb. 13, 1954.

[21] Rostow, op. cit., p. 84.

668 involved in a community work project directed by the local cadre.

668 527 Settlement of accounts before the New Year holiday now means payment of taxes and the sale to the government of most of the balance of the farmer's grain, for which he receives coupons. The cadres carry this out at the village level.[22] The New Year festival itself is characterized by some traditional activities, modified to promote government aims, and by some new features. The peasant may buy New Year's pictures to decorate his house, but they will probably be romanticized portraits of Mao and other Communist heroes rather than the colorful deities of former days.[23] He may decorate his gate with paired mottoes, but the mottoes will no longer carry the old wishes for long life, happiness, and wealth, but exhortations to conform to Communist [525] standards.[24] The government may allow some additional food for the season, but gambling is forbidden, and social life has been so thoroughly organized that it can no longer be restricted to family and friends. 668 536 The peasants have been urged to organize their

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[22] SCMP 979, F b. 2, 1955, p. 30.

[23] Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.

[24] Cf. the collection of mottoes in Hua-nan T'ung-shu [South China Almanac], Canton, 1953, p. 32.

668 own dramatic troupes to play the approved
536 repertoire, now brought to villages by
traveling troupes. Special mobile teams
668 trained to deliver organized "cultural lectures"
208 or to show films dramatizing the "New Order"
have been moving through the countryside.
The old exchange of visits with relatives in
nearby towns now has its Communist counterpart: interchange of visits between urban and rural workers' groups to observe one another's "progress in Communist reconstruction."[25]

668 The seasonal pilgrimage, in company, to some famous shrine also has its Communist counterpart: mass pilgrimages to Mao Tse-tung's native village, which is being publicized as a national shrine.[26] Despite its frontal attack on the old familism, the Communist government last year provided special trains to take city dwellers back to their native villages for the holiday; a mass exodus was reported from Peking.[27]

796 Ch'ing-ming is no longer an approved
668 festival, presumably because of its function

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[25] Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid. Also, SCMP, 972, 1954, p. 21. We have no data on this for the Southwest.

776 as a celebration of kinship ties and family
668 continuity. Although we have no data, it is
safe to assume that the elaborate festival
calendar of "West Town," Hunan, described
by Hsü, has been severely reduced by "anti-superstition"
campaigns and other work of
527 the cadres.[28] The next approved traditional
668 holiday is the Dragon Boat festival in June.
The boat races have been revived, and the poet
Ch'ü Yüan, now a "people's hero, martyred in
portest against a corrupt feudal regime," is
the focus of celebrations.[29] The moon festival
in autumn is also celebrated with extra food
allowances and "cultural" activities. The
various anniversaries of the Chinese Communists
and of the world Communist movement probably
do not break into the agricultural working year,
but may be the occasion for special propaganda
arranged by the local cadre. It will be seen
that the pattern of living in the villages has been
drastically altered; what remains of the old
pattern consists of elements too deeply ingrained
to be abruptly condemned without precipitating
a crisis, useful to the Communists in the
interest of morale, or adaptable in the promotion
of their rural program of change and indoctrinatic

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[28] Cf. Hsü, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

[29] SCMP, 1075, June 23, 1955, p. 25.

III. CHANGING PATTERNS OF LIVING

668 In the towns and cities, as in the countryside, the greatest changes in living patterns have been brought about by the network of new associations by which the regime envelops and controls the individual. Workers in various traditional crafts, merchants, industrial workers, all are organized by the Party, and it is within these groups, under the guidance of cadres, that the urban working population is most strenuously indoctrinated. In long and frequent meetings, the city dweller is under intense pressure to manifest "correct attitudes," to show himself free of all "feudal" and "bourgeois" taint, and to demonstrate his complete commitment to Communist goals. Through these and other channels he is under continual pressure to step up his efficiency and productivity. The meetings take such a toll of his energy at the end of the working day that they are openly referred to as "fatigue meetings."[30]

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668 City and town dwellers are also organized into street and ward units, which serve further to mold urban life into the new pattern.[31] The

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[30] Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.

[31] Cf.,"Regulations of Urban Organizations," Current Background, 310, Jan. 17, 1955.

632 townsman, more than the peasant, is open to
668 an "around the clock" propaganda barrage. From the first call to early morning calisthenics, the radio blares in every street until late at night. There is pressure to join sports groups, study groups -- all with their ideological purposes. The major Communist holidays are celebrated in the cities with great parades and with endless speeches. Privacy and the chance to be at ease with family or friends are rare.

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527 The New Year's holiday has some of its old gaiety, although subject to the same restrictions imposed on the peasant. The cities receive special shipments of seasonal delicacies, they appear to do at the mid-autumn and Dragon Boat festivals, and trips back to the family village may be possible for a minority of the urban population.[32] New Year's activities in 1955 suggest the way in which

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[32] Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2. In preparation for the New Year exodus from the cities in 1955, the Ministry of Railways estimated that "over three and half million more people will travel than on normal days, mostly to join in united family celebrations of the holiday." NCNA dispatch, Jan. 19, 1955; SCMP, 972, Jan. 20, 1955, p. 21.

668 527 all public celebrations of the festival are made to serve the Communist purpose. It was reported that, in the coastal area, traditional merrymaking was combined "with strict vigilance and celebration of the Yikiangshan (I-chiang-shan) Island liberation." In Foochow, special exhibitions on the theme "Taiwan Must be Liberated" drew large crowds. In the Amoy area and along the Chekiang coast, people called on units of the armed forces in their neighborhood "to bring them gifts and thank them for their efforts in national defense." In Shanghai, 40,000 spectators watched military teams play football, and Red Army song and danc troupes performed at thirty factories.[33]

668 [653] 369 The cities have been cleaned up and enlarged, large sections of old city walls such as those of Chengtu have been destroyed, and building has apparently proceeded rapidly, although improvements in housing probably mainly affect the industrial workers, the favored class in the drive for industrialization.[34]

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33. NCNA dispatch, Jan. 27, 1955, 976, Jan. 28, 1955, p. 15. In all such activities one should remember that the cadre is instigator and manager. We do not have details on activities in the Southwest. We would expect them to be similar in outline, less elaborate in form.

34. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.

[511] ● 668 369 Yet the Rostow study indicates that there has been no real increase in wages for the urban worker.[35] His diet remains poor, his work hours long. But since the Party is anxious to recruit from urban workers, he does have opportunity to rise in life through Party work. Many industrial workers probably do feel some sense of identification with the most rapidly expanding sector of the Chinese economy. This identification and the opportunities offered by the Party are probably slowly changing the goals of the urban worker. He may be less interested than he was once in returning to a plot of land in the country, where economic opportunities are increasingly restricted. He knows, after attending one Party meeting, that the peasantry is no longer the favored class in the Chinese economy.

The elite of the towns and cities are the functionaries of the government and Party. We know little of the pattern of their private lives. But, if the badge of the old Chinese bureaucratic elite was a leisurely and cultivated air, the badge of the new is a daily calendar of meetings, a full briefcase, and an air of purposeful, energetic activity. Their incomes permit their families somewhat easier

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35. Ibid., pp. 160-61.

● 668 life than that granted the rest of the urban
369 population, but they are constantly disciplined, watched by their colleagues, obliged to meet work quotas, and forced to submit to continuous indoctrination and re-indoctrination. Party and government workers are urged to use the New Year holiday to plan their work for the year to come.

The bulk of the old middle class may have survived, but its activities have been increasingly restricted by government controls and the growth of government producing and marketing facilities. They are a tough and tenacious group, but their old comfortable life is already threatened and, as a class, they are scheduled for extinction.[36]

The growing cities now appear to be replacing the country as the goal of the ambitious. It is likely that, as urbanization and industrialization proceed, the cities rather than the farm villages will determine, as the Communists plan, the new mores and patterns of living for society as a whole.

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[36] Rostow, op. cit., pp. 162-64.

181 178 There have been profound changes in basic attitudes over the last century and particularly during the last five years. Change has been brought about by two factors. The first is the disintegration of the old social and political order resulting from its failure to adapt itself to the problems and pressures of the modern world. Consequently, people became critical of the older attitudes and, in increasing numbers, adopted newer "modern" attitudes and values which were considered better suited to a modern China. The second is the power of the Communist state which, in the last five years, has been used to inculcate a new and uniform set of values and attitudes.

181 668 These two factors are closely inter-related. Thus, the Communists have been making a sympathetic use of individual and group-dissatisfaction with the old order to inspire and promote the acceptance of the new attitudes and values; the latter's appeal has been particularly strong with youth -- especially adolescents -- and with women who have been taught to regard the old social order as tyrannical and oppressive. The following will illustrate this last point:

> Co-operative agriculture has organization,
> and women are not left out.
> In the old society we were badly mistreated,
> but the new society teaches friendship and love.[29]

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[29] Fu-nü San-tzu Ching [Three-character Classic for Women], Hsin-hua Publishing House, 1950, p.21. Three-character rhymed verses [cont'd next page]

181 In addition to capitalizing on discontent, the
668 Communists have been making a peculiar use of traditional attitudes and values. Certain values from the old order still have a strong emotional appeal for the Chinese people. And the Communists seek to make the new order more acceptable by associating some of its elements with selected elements from the traditional culture. For example, they insist that as a guiding principle of personal behavior the idea of "struggle" (tou-cheng) must replace that of "harmony" (ho).[30] People are taught to struggle for self-perfection and to engage in class struggle, in the struggle for a new China, and in the struggle against deviation even when this involves attacking their friends. This is utterly contrary to the old ideal of harmony in personal relations, an ideal that means in practice a comfortable adjustment to one's natural and human environments. Yet in urging all to struggle, the Communists insist that the ultimate goal of all struggle is the Ta-t'ung ching-yü -- the traditional utopian ideal of a harmonious, frictionless social order.[31]

[29. from previous page] were widely used in traditional China for the indoctrination of the young.

[30] Cf. Arthur F. Wright, "Struggle vs. Harmony: Symbols of Competing Values in Modern China," World Politics, Vol. VI (Oct. 1953) pp. 31-44.

[31] Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship, 3rd. ed., Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1950, pp. 16-17. For Mao, of course, this term means ultimate world-wide Communist utopia.

In discussing certain attitudes and values we should bear in mind that the power of the old and the appeal of the new vary not according to regions but according to social groups. It was among the population of modern cities like Shanghai that the old values were first challenged by the pressures of modern problems, but among the peasantry and rural gentry, despite many discontents and tensions, the old ways still prevailed.[32] Intellectuals and members of the new industrial and commercial groups were the first to discard traditional attitudes and adopt Western values; among other groups this process was slower. These variations affect Communist tactics to the extent that different kinds of persuasion are used with different groups. But the final goal is adoption of the attitudes and values decreed by the Communist leadership. 181 668 369 565

A. Good and Bad

In traditional China the prevailing belief was that man was inherently good and that social harmful behavior occurred only when men lacked guidance or were placed in adverse circumstances. For example, if the ruler of the state or his officials or the father of the family failed to provide for the basic physical needs of individuals, their dependents were likely to rebel. Or if those in authority failed to provide instruction, particularly if they failed to set an example in conduct, then those subordinate to them would have no guideposts to the good and would fall into evil ways. 183

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[32] For example, as late as 1941-43, one anthropologist found in rural Yunan that the traditional value of hsiao (filial submission) was still,

[redacted]

expressed disapproval of a rigorous enforcement of rules and regulations, of an enforcement that fails to take into account "human feelings."[33] The criteria for judging behavior as good or bad were therefore neither religious nor legalistic, but were the prevailing norms in the community, the customary practices sanctioned by tradition and ratified by a high degree of community consensus. 183

In traditional Chinese goodness could be cultivated through practice, study, and contemplation. Confucianism held that the path to goodness was open to all, that those who attained a high order of goodness should be a moral elite, a group of exemplars for others. This moral elite was also, in Confucian theory, the group which should hold and exercise political power and enjoy the rewards of status and wealth. This nation sanctioned the long political dominance of the scholar-official.

The Chinese Communists have laid out new standards of good and bad. In the words of their leading theoretician, their aim is". . .to reform mankind into the completely selfless citizenry of a Communist society."[34] In setting the new standards the Communists have consciously and unconsciously selected concepts from traditional moral 183, 668.

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[33] Ruth Bunzel and John Weakland, "An Anthropological Approach to Chinese Communism," Columbia Univ. Research in Contemporary Cultures, New York, 1952, pp. 80-81. Hereafter cited as Bunzel-Weakland.

[34] Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Training of the Communist Party Member," first presented as a speech in 1939; cf. trans. in Boyd Compton, Mao's China, Seattle, 1952, p. 146.

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183 ideas; some have been discarded, others have been taken over with little adaptation; still others linger
118 between the lines and in the implications of Communist utterances.

The old virtues associated with the traditional family have been discarded because the old family system has been dissolved, its functions taken over by the modern conjugal family on the one hand and by state and Party organizations on the other.[35] Familial virtues are castigated as "feudal" and as backward features of what the leadership calls "the squalid old society of China."[36]

The basic Marxist dogma that the individual is molded by his class position and, indirectly, by the "stage" of the society into which he is born, has a good deal in common with the Confucian view of the prime importance of environment in the formation of character. Thus the Communist effort to create a new society, in both traditional Chinese and Marxist terms, will create a favorable environment for the development of individual goodness. But the "goodness" expected is different: "To sacrifice the individual for the sake of the Party, for the sake of the class, for national liberation, or the liberation of mankind, even to sacrifice one's own life without the slightest hesitation, with a feeling

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35. J.M.H. Lindbeck, "Communist Policy and the Chinese Family," Far Eastern Survey, #20, (July 25, 1951), pp. 137-41.

36. Liu Shao-ch'i, quoted in David S. Nivison, Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition, Stanford University, 1954, p. 15. Nivison's study will appear in symposium, Thought and Officialdom in China, Univ. of Chicago Press, early 1956.

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of happiness -- this is the highest expression of Communist morality..."[37]

This is the basic principle: utter subordination of the individual to the Party. But when we examine some of the personal qualities which the Communists want, we find them linked in many ways to Chinese tradition. The good Communist is "able to love others and hate others" (A phrase from the Analects of Confucius); that is, he never injures his comrades for his own benefit but vigorously fights the enemies of the revolution. Towards his comrades his attitude is one of "genuineness and sympathy." (Analects) He does "nothing to others that he would not have done to himself." (Analects) He "grieves before all the rest of the world grieves and is happy only after all the rest of the world is happy." (Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva-savior, adapted by an eleventh century Confucian thinker.) He "has no individual apprehensions or private desires to obscure and pervert his investigation of things and understanding of true principles," (a restatement of the late Confucian view of purity of mind as being necessary for true knowledge.)[38]

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[37] Liu Shao-ch'i "On the Training of the Communist Party Member" in Compton, op. cit., p. 110. Nivison, op. cit., p. 18, points out that this prescription is close to the classic descriptions of the traditional virtue of chung -- absolute loyalty to superiors.

[38] These characterizations are all from authoritative treatise by Liu Shao-ch'i, ibid., translated in Compton, op. cit., pp. 108-55. Traditional sources are identified in Nivison, op.cit., p. 19-20.

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To attain these and other "good" qualities, the Communist, like his Confucian ancestors, is to pattern his character after approved models and to subject himself to intensive self-cultivation. In traditional China, the models of character and behavior found in the classics and histories were to be studied and followed by individuals who sought to improve themselves. Books on filial piety were required reading. Now the Communists set up Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao as personal models; everyone is capable of attaining the great qualities of these revolutionary geniuses if he tries.[39] Even selected heroes from China's "feudal past" are recommended as models.[40] Such models are presented in fiction, in textbooks, in newspapers, and young and old are urged to emulate these heroes. In addition, "model" workers, farmers, soldiers are feted and publicized, and their pictures and idealized biographies appear in all propaganda media.

Self-cultivation consists of being unremittingly conscious of one's faults and of Communist ideals, of being ever alert, in study and action, to the recrudescence of "bad" attitudes which are the residue of one's pre-Communist education. Liu Shao-ch'i stresses the development of consciousness in the individual; through consciousness one is free from the determining forces of

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[39] Liu Shao-ch'i, op.cit., quoted in Nivison, p. 16.

[40] Ch'en Sang, "Tang-hsing Yu Ssu Cheng-huo" [Party Nature and Private Life] in Lun Tang Yü Ko-jen [On the Party and the Individual] by Ch'en Po-ta and others, Hong Kong reprint, 1948, p. 3, cited in Nivison, op.cit., p. 76, note 16.

183 history and environment and becomes capable of
working creatively for the aims of the new society.
168 This emphasis on consciousness is connected with both traditional ethics and Soviet psychology. On the one hand, it has "an obvious affinity to the Neo-Confucian notion of cultivation as freeing the individual from the tyranny of blind habit and unconscious selfish motivations."[41] On the other, it reflects the recent development of Soviet psychology; from an earlier denunciation of consciousness as "smacking of bourgeois idealism" the Russians have come to the view that "consciousness is a central process in making man capable of forging his own destinies."[42]

The list of bad qualities denounced by Communists is long; liberalism, formalism, bureaucratism, opportunism, and a dozen others are being continually denounced. How does one rid onself of these vices? The following formula, here used against the vice of individualism, is typical:

> "The methods transmitted by the ancients for raising oneself out of the vulgar state and entering sagehood, becoming a Buddha or a Taoist spirit, all required one to go through a long period of discipline. If we want to shed the early form of individualism and acquire a spiritual form of collectivism, we must cultivate and discipline ourselves over and over; ...we should continually ask ourselves this question: 'Am I or am I not still guilty of individualism?' If we have a thought, utter a sentence, walk a step or do a thing, we should listen for the response

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[41] Cf. Nivison, op.cit., p. 15.

[42] [next page]

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of others [the group] : this is -- or is not -- individualism."[43]

The last sentence quoted above introduces the notion of group criticism and group pressure, which is the universal Communist device for fostering approved behavior and eliminating the disapproved. Members of Party organizations, professions, government bureaus, and all other groups meet continually for criticism and self-criticism, and this whole process reaches the population through the publication of confessions and criticism in the mass media. The study meetings, popularly called "struggle meetings," are characterized by an atmosphere of tension and fear. Confessions of deviation or defect are made by individuals and analyzed or "exposed by the group; criticisms are leveled at individuals and promises of reform are exacted.[44] This appears to be a device of deadly effectiveness for making individuals conform to the new Communist standards for thought and behavior.

B. Time, Change, and Causation

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In traditional China, time and change were

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[42] Cf. Raymond Bauer, The New Man in Soviet Psychology, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 164 and passim. The quotations are from Jerome Bruner's forword to this volume, xxii.

[43] Lun Tang Yü Ko-jen [On the Party and the Individual], cited in Nivison, op.cit., pp.45-46, and note 66.

[44] Cf. Anon., "The 'Struggle Meeting' in Communist China," Far Eastern Notes, No. 1. April 21, 1952.

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regarded as cyclical. Out of their careful adjustment to the seasonal and recurrent rhythms of Nature, Chinese-farmer-thinkers developed a notion of time and change which they applied to the course of individual lives, to changes in political life, to history as a whole. In the life of man, old age was not seen a the end of the line but as a return to childhood -- not in the sense of "second childhood" but as having come full round from the freedom of childhood to the freedom of old age. In political thinking at all levels a notion of the cycle is present. Dynasties, like men and animals, were regarded as having a natural life, from birth, through growth, to maturity, senescence, and death; these phases differed in length but the cycle was never broken. Integration and disintegration followed one another as day followed night. The opening line of the most widely read Chinese classic novel states this prevailing belief: "When empire has long been unified it will invariably be divided." [45]

The Communists seek to extirpate this age-old attitude and substitute for it the modern western idea of straight-line progress. For them the future is not to be a return to the past but the attainment, through protracted struggle, of a Communist world utopia. Textbook Party handbooks, and all other media insist on this new and revolutionary idea of time and change. This dynamic straight-line change

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[45] San-kuo Chih Yen-i, [The Romance of the Three Kingdoms], translated by Prewitt-Taylor.

178 181 •668 is typically and authoritatively expressed by Liu Shao-ch'i:

> "It is in the course of the long struggle of men as social beings against nature, that men's physical forms..., their social relations, their forms of social organization as well as their brains, ideology, etc., are all continuously being changed and improved...."[46]

The traditional Chinese view of causation was related to their views of time and change. Sequences of events were seen to have a certain regularity, not that of cause and effect. Night follows day, but day is not the cause of night.[47] Through education one learned how to identify situations and to know the sorts of things that might happen. One learned to place oneself advantageously in a sequence of situations. The Communists seek to replace this older view with the Marxist idea of causation. A student is to learn the Marxist laws of social development, that certain causes always bring certain effects, and that when one has mastered the laws of causation, one can actively participate in bringing about the desired and inevitable results.

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[46] Liu Shao-ch'i, "On the Training of the Communist Party Member." For this passage, cf. Current Background, No. 159, Jan. 31, 1952, p. 18.

[47] Bunzel-Weakland, p. 31.

178 668 181 The Communist effort to replace the old attitudes toward time, change, and causation with new ones has tremendous implications. It seeks to destroy any tinge of fatalism, any inclination toward resignation, and to foster in the individual a restless search for the goals set by the Party.

C. Work and Leisure

461 668 In traditional China, leisure was seen as a time for replenishment of bodily and psychic energy; leisure was necessary if one were not to suffer depletion of vital forces.[48] Abundant leisure was also important evidence of membership in the favored social class. In Communist China, work and vigorous activity are given a high value; hard work and ceaseless struggle are characteristic of all the "models" held up before the people in all the propaganda media. The ceaseless activity of the top leaders is meant to set a pattern for those who follow them. Leisure as contemplative bodily replenishment is devaluated, and active sports which develop competitive spirit are being promoted. Leisure as a mark of high status has disappeared.

D. Authority and the Individual

577 The father's relation to his sons was the model for the exercise of authority in traditional China. Ideally, the father was to be firm and aloof, seeing to it rather impersonally that his children were well cared for and given proper instruction.

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[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 37-40.

181 178 system was undermined and began slowly to disintegrate. Chinese critics held that the old family stifled individuality, prevented the development of individual initiative vital to modern China, and that it was a breeding ground for authoritarianism, hindering the development of democratic citizenship. They also felt that a new kind of individual was needed, and that the family system prevented its birth.[52]

181 668 The Communists are developing a new image of the individual and a new relationship between the individual and authority; in doing this they are using certain of the old family ideas and, capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the old family system, they are releasing the individual from his bonds and pushing him into a new system of human relations.

181 668 596 The Communists have paid particular attention to the groups which suffered most under the old family: women, particularly younger women, such as daughters-in-law, and adolescents. Bitter denunciations of the tyranny of the old family system by dramatizing its inequities, insistence on the individual's loyalty to the Party rather than to the family -- all these are being resorted to in order to create new individuals suited to the needs of a Communist society. In Communist literature this new type of individual, free of the family and its "feudal" relationships, is presented as having boundless opportunities for self-development. Stories

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[52] Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

596 of young "heroes" who have broken away -- some-
181 times denouncing their "reactionary" fathers --
668 and gone on to make striking contributions to state
● and society are glorified in almost every publication.

573 "Comradeship," the brother-friend type of relationship, is strongly emphasized in Party and
668 other organizations. During the long years of their suppression, the Communist leadership was bound together by "comradeship," which is continually romanticized and extolled in textbooks and other writings. This pattern of human relationships is built on an age-old Chinese ideal and is most attractive to those who suffered most under the old family system. It is used to encourage co-operation between individuals in a common task. In the textbooks it is fostered by moral tales -- a pail of water is too heavy for Little Brother and too heavy for Big Brother, but it is easily carried by the two; a lone tree is easily shaken by the wind, but many trees standing together can withstand a heavy wind.[53]

576 The brotherhood-friendship pattern among
668 top Communist leadership has subtly shifted, and
643 Mao and the Party have begun to exercise paternal
authority over subordinates and the people as a whole. Mao has taken on many of the attributes of the supreme patriarchal emperors of old; his paternal guidance is praised in these lines from an officially published song:

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[53] Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p.325.

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The great leader is like a father,
Mao Tse-tung educates us....[54]

● 668 Another praises his paternal care for his people

In loving care for the people
He surpasses that of their own
fathers and mothers.[55]

And, in a children's song, his paternal care and affection are invoked while he is likened to the pole star -- one of the old symbols of the emperor's supremacy:

The northern pole star in the sky --
In China, Mao Tse-tung --
Saving Mankind,
Loving little children.
He'll destroy Chiang's dirty rats.[56]

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596 As Mao takes on more and more attributes of the father, the Party and the state take over both the functions and the emotional focus once supplied by the family. A labor heroine is described as

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[54] From a song in Chieh-fang Ko-sheng [Liberation songs], No. 2, 1949, p. 9.

[55] From a song in K'ang-mei Yüan-ch'ao Hsiao-t'iao chi [A Collection of Resist-America-Aid-Korea Songs], Wu-han t'ung-su ch'u-pan-she, Wuhan, 1951, p. 60.

[56] From a song in Nung-ts'un Ko-yao Hsüan-chi [A Song Collection of Rural Themes], Hsin-hua ch'u-pan-she, 1950, p. 24.

"a good daughter of the Party."[57] A song says:

> Our great fatherland-
> We should pay it the same filial reverence,
> As we would show to our mothers.[58]

These quotations suggest the reorientation of loyalties away from the family, but note that the terms and images used are those of the family system itself -- a typical example of the Communist use of the old order to destroy the old order. The functions of the traditional extended family are divided among the Party, the state, and the new type conjugal family. The individual, not the family, now chooses his mate -- often with "advice from Party comrades," and the state, not the family, sanctions the match.[59] The child is taught to rely on himself rather than on his relatives, and state nurseries take over, for many parents, the function of child care.[60] In illness

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[57] Cf. *Jen-min Hua-pao*[*People's Pictorial*] Vol. 2, No. 2, 1951.

[58] In *Ch'ang-chiang Ko-sheng*[*Yantze Songs*], No. 7, Hsin-hua ch'u-pan she, Wuhan Branch, Wuhan, 1950, p. 15.

[59] Cf. Lindbeck, *op.cit.*, pp. 140-41.

[60] The poem "Wen Pao-pao ["Ask Baby"] appeared in lower primary grade textbook in 1950. It has the baby asking for various members of the family to carry him. But each member is busy at a separate task: hoeing grain, tending a machine, writing speeches, etc., and baby ends by saying, "Everybody has something to do. I'd rather walk alone by holding onto a wall." Translated in Weakland-Bunzel, Appendix B.

181 one looks to state and Party health agencies, but
● 668 responsibility for the care of the aged devolves
596 upon the children of the conjugal family.[61] The family's function as an administrative unit for mutual surveillance and responsibility is now eliminated, and each citizen is responsible to the state. Family connections are no longer a means of getting jobs; they are assigned to individuals by state and Party organizations. In this way the Communists undermine what is left of the old family and strike at the age-old evil of nepotism.

Yet, with the shattering of the old family and the assumption of its functions by the state, the individual is still urged by the leadership to work in a disciplined and co-operative way for the larger social group. The following prescription for individual behavior recalls the formulas for the activity of good members of the traditional family.

> Citizens of the People's Republic are expected to engage in labor and productive activities and to place the common good above personal benefit. They must learn to be helpful and co-operative. They must work hard and submit willingly to the discipline of group life. They must always be ready to learn to accept criticism for the purpose of improvement.[62]

It would appear, then, that the Communist government tries to adapt both patterns of individual-group relationship to its purposes. On the one hand it encourages the equal co-operation pattern

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[61. and 62. on following page]

181 associated with the old image of brotherhood
668 and friendship. On the other hand it increasingly
596 subjects each individual to a type of authority that is reminiscent of the old all-powerful father of the family. For certain types of work, for example, team projects carried on by Party cadres, the former may be encouraged as the efficient pattern. But for the masses of the population, submission to absolute paternalistic authority and the subordination of the individual to the group is the ordained pattern.

E. *Face*

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668 In traditional China, "face" meant one's moral reputation (*lien*) and one's accumulated moral and material prestige in the eyes of the community (*mien-tzu*). One's *lien*, or moral reputation, was solidified by adherence to the ethical norms of society in all human dealings. One's *mien-tzu* could be increased by making important contacts, by acts of conspicuous generosity; but this could be done only *within the rôle* which society

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61. Cf. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 973, Jan. 21, 1955, pp. 31-32; "...when parents are 'counterrevolutionaries', the child should treat them as enemies.

62. Cf. Theodore Chen, *op.cit.*, p. 324, and Weakland-Bunzel, pp. 153-54.

63. Cf. Hsien-chin Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of Face," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 46 (1944), pp. 45-64. The word *lien* is more current in North China than in the Yangtze Valley and the south. In the lower Yangtze Valley, according to Miss Hu (p. 46, note 5), *mien-k'ung* is used for *lien*.

577 assigned to the individual. To "get above oneself" in a play for prestige was actually "to lose face" 668 (tiu mien-tzu). The widespread use of go-betweens in business, marriages, and political negotiations was a device for insuring that, in the event of failure, neither principal would "lose face." Consideration for the "face" of others was highly regarded, and, in actual behavior, care for one's own and others' "face," particularly of one's family, was conducive to the surface harmony of Chinese social relations.

Modern Chinese critics have argued that this harmony was too dearly bought, that individual concern for "face," intensified by community pressure, stifled individual initiative and made creative people into timid conformists who sacrificed all for the preservation of superficial prestige in the community. This, they held, worked against China's successful adjustment to the modern world.

The Communists have built on this sort of criticism and dissatisfaction and, in seeking to release individual energies for the purposes of the Communist state, have made a frontal attack on the notion of "face." Mao sarcastically describes the attitude they seek to destroy: "Failing to start an argument in principle with a person, even when you know he is in the wrong, letting things slide for the sake of peace and cordiality, all because he is an old friend, a fellow villager, a fellow student, a close friend, someone beloved, an old colleague, or an old subordinate. Or failing to make any clear

577 668 decision, speaking about [the error] in allusions in order to preserve harmony and unity...."[64]

577 668 554 The Communists single out for public recognition individuals who have ruthlessly battered their way toward one of the Communist goals with utter disregard for "face," their own or others'. They praise children who have denounced their father, which, in older China, would have been condemned as utter destruction of the family's "face." Communist writings indicate that the older attitudes have been hard to overcome. Liu Shao-ch'i is fulminating against them when he says "Any idea of trying to avoid inner-Party struggle, or of refraining from criticizing others' mistakes so that they will not criticize one's own errors, is utterly wrong."[65] Obviously the universal "struggle meetings" for personal criticism and self-criticism in the presence of the group are destructive of the old feeling for "face." Indeed the leadership may regard them as one of the principal devices for the complete elimination of this traditional attitude.

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[64] Mao Tse-tung, "In Opposition to Liberalism," written in 1937, translation in Compton, op.cit., pp. 184-85.

[65] Liu Shao-ch'i, "On Inner-Party Struggle Current Background, No. 105, Aug. 5, 1951, p. 5.

[redacted]

538 to literature also pertains to the other arts. Therefore, as far as the theory and policy of the arts are concerned, no separate treatment is necessary.

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563 Only in the less sophisticated folk literature and folk art does the Southwest retain its unique regional characteristics. However, even in this respect, the Southwest is by no means a separate entity. Parts of Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan, being largely populated by the Han Chinese from the provinces east of them, are more closely related to the Central China tradition; other parts of these provinces are populated by a variety of ethnic minorities, each having its own unique cultural pattern. The cultural policies toward these minorities are part of the national policies and are decided in Peking.

No attempt is made in this chapter to describe the propaganda and information machine of the Chinese Communists in which literature and art are made to play their part. For this, consult the chapters on propaganda and information in this handbook.

I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LITERARY ACTIVITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

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668 The reform of literature and art (wen-i cheng-feng) at Yenan in 1942 [1] made the practice of literature and art in the Liberated Areas overt political activities; the application of the same line to the entire country in 1949 subjugated all

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1. [See following page.]

538 writers and artists in the nation to the service of
668 the state. Control and regimentation of thought in literature and art became more systematic as the Communistsconsolidated their power, the victor being the arbiter of artistic "truth." In

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1. Mao Tse-tung's speeches at the Party School in Yenan in February and at the Yenan Literary and Art Circles' meeting in May 1942 established the "line" of literature and art which had been endorsed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and which has since been upheld as the creed of writers and artists in Communist China. The general tnor of the speeches was that literary and art workers at Yenan, being undeniably "revolutionaries by choice," should stop the hitherto blind imitation of alien and imported prototypes and the singing of abstract, contentless tunes which had nothing to do with the revolution and, as such, would not be understood by the peasant-worker-soldier masses. In their place, fresh and lively revolutionary themes in the Chinese style would be appreciated. Although in principle Mao believed that Chinese literature and art should benefit from masterpieces of other cultures, especially those produced in the Soviet Union, in no instance would he allow the separation of Chinese literature and art from immediate revolutionary tasks; and on this basis he puts the popularization of literature and art ahead of sophistication. See Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Peking, Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1953, Vol. 3, pp. 833-900.

general, the control over writers, artists, and their work takes three forms, as was true in the Liberated Areas after the 1942 reform: (1) the organization of writers and artists under government auspices; (2) the identification of the duties of the writers and artists with the implementation of government policy; and (3) the intentional and unceasing use of literary and art criticism to keep writers and artists in line. Now, however, the scope is national.

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A. The All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles

In July 1949, before the establishment of the Central People's Government, writers and artists from various parts of China were "invited" to Peking where the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles was organized to co-ordinate the activities of a number of the nationwide organizations in specific cultural fields, such as literature, art, music, and the cinema; it was to follow the line laid down by Mao Tse-tung in 1942. Theoretically, the federation is not a government body, but it sent delegates to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949, as did Communist-sponsored political factions and mass organizations. The chairman and vice-chairman of the federation were given posts in the Communist government.

At the organizational meeting in July, Chou En-lai told the gathered writers and artists that they were the representatives of 70,000 literary and art workers in China, of which 30,000 were in the People's Liberation Army, another 30,000 scattered in the old Liberated Areas, and

[redacted]

538 the remaining 10,000 in areas recently liberated
668 from the Kuomintang. From Chou's statement it becomes obvious that he identified as writers and artists Party propaganda personnel and those workers engaged in raising the standard of literacy.[2] It is doubtful that the majority of these 70,000 so-called writers and artists had achieved high competence in intellectual and artistic expression. Two years later, the Communists' leading woman author, Ting Ling, was still complaining that as editor she had difficulty in finding acceptable manuscripts for her magazine.[3]

It is certain that the organization of these writers and artists put the politically dubious under the guidance and supervision of the politically reliable; and the organized state rendered the writers and artists collectively responsible for their part in the Communist cause. Furthermore, dominated as it was by veteran Communists, the organization embracing all China's well-known writers and artists served as a good Communist-style "democratic front."

B. The Task of the Writer

The literary subdivision of the federation was the All-China Association of Literary Workers, which, like the federation's other subdivisions, has its own professional magazine, People's Literature. In the first issue, published in October 1949, the sixfold task of the magazine was stated in part as follows:

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[2] Chou En-lai, "Political Report at the Conference of the All-China Literary and Art Workers," (July 6, 1949), People's Literature, Peking, 1,3, Jan.1,1950,p.17.

[3] [see next page]

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1. To participate in the People's Liberation War and in the construction of the "New Democratic nation: through literary forms that are treasured by the people, with ideological content reflecting the growth of the new nation and praising the contribution of the masses in revolutionary struggles and productive activities;

2. to rid literature of imperialist influence and to reform traditional literature; to accept what is "good" in foreign literary and artistic endeavor;

3. to guide the masses in factories, villages, and in the ranks in their literary study, and to help increase their "literary strength";

4. to develop literatures of the ethnic minorities;

5. to study revolutionary theory and to organize groups for the study and discussion of the new literary productions and the formulation of a "scientific" theory of literary criticism;

6. to promote interflow of literature and

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3. Ting Miao, A General Analysis of Chinese Communist Literature and Art, Hong Kong Ya-chou ch'u-pan she, 1954, pp. 149-50.

4. People's Literature, I, 1, Oct.25,1959, p. 13. The content of this declaration reads very much like the constitution of the Union of Soviet Writers in the USSR. [see next page]

538 art among nations; to develop patriotism and
668 internationalism; and to participate in "struggle for peace" as led by the USSR.[4]

Before the writers of the association had time to demonstrate their ability to implement these policies by fulfilling pledges to turn out so many pieces of work in a stipulated period of time, the conflict in Korea began.

The war was utilized by the Party as a schooling ground for class education and was depicted as a panorama of international class struggle. On this pretext writers were sent to the front to learn about "reality" in order to delineate the struggle of the heroes of the day and to draw the moral of the times. They were expected to make the most out of their experience not only by reporting immediate events but also by recording their impressions in notes which would later serve as material for more lengthy literary works. With the exception of Pa Chin's Living Among the Heroes, Wei Wei's Who Are the Most Lovable People?, Lu Chu-kuo's Shang-kan Mountain, Yang Shuo's Three Thousand-Li Territory, and a few others which are readable and maintain certain literary standards, other writings based upon the authors' experiences at the Korean front do not show maturity even in the handling of the Chinese language. However, the Chinese Communists claimed that these second-rate writings adequately express the Chinese Volunteers' patriotism and Communist internationalism.

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In sending professional writers to Korea the Communists departed from one of their most boasted practices. Throughout the war against Japan and the "war of liberation" against the Kuomintang, Chinese soldiers were encouraged to write, and writings from the ranks were hailed and widely publicized. But professional writers were chosen for Korea, probably in the hope that they would effect a more skillful literary dramatization of the Communist cause.

However, the Korean front was not the only place where writers were to learn about "reality" and to dramatize the "cause of the people." While the war was going on, Ai Wu, Ts'ao Yü, the noted playwright, and other writers, were sent to factories; Ho Ching-tzu, author of The White-Haired Girl, was sent to study life in the villages; Ting Hsi-lin, Liu Ch'ing, Li Tzu-hua, Mu Yen, and a host of other veteran motion picture producers and directors were sent to Shanghai to participate in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns.[5]

But these writers were not to record life as they observed it. Before they left for their "life schools," they had to undergo some "training." One can imagine the situation: writers of the calibre of Pa Chin and Ts'ao Yü learning from the speeches of Lu Ting-i and Ch'en Po-ta, the two propaganda chiefs of the regime, "how to describe people, how to abstract living reality and exercise care in collecting material, how to portray and praise, and above all, how to avoid making mistakes." It would appear that the Communists were so eager to prove the righteous-

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[5] See chapter on Subversive Potentialties in handbook for impact of Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns.

538 668 ness of their actions that they carefully arranged that "history" should be recorded exactly in the way they wished it to seem.

Judging from the extent to which the land reform turned the rural, social and political order upside-down, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns destroyed the bourgeois stronghold in the national economy, and the way in which the war in Korea affected the national life, one might expect that those writers who had been given the opportunity to witness these momentous events would accomplish literary feats of equal magnitude. On the contrary, one finds, with only rare exceptions, "formula" stories which have all the correct political ingredients demanded of them but which lack originality and any attempt at characterization. One story of land reform reads much like another, the only differences being the names given the heroes and some few idiosyncracies of the writers in the use of colloquial expressions and political jargon. Adherence to a prescribed political formula blights all creativeness.

C. Literary Criticism

What has contributed most to this fear of originality in literature is the influence of officially organized and directed literary criticism, which uses Communist literary theories to coërce and browbeat the writers. The disparity in the respect given critical and creative forces has stunted the young Communist literature and precluded a normal growth.

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668 Outstanding instances of the enervating effect of Communist criticism are the reviews of the play, "The Song of the Red Flags," and the story, "Old Worker Ku Fu-shan." The play, concerning shock-teams in a production drive, was initially praised by the Communists themselves; later, it was criticized because "it did not give a strong portrayal of the trade union and the Party." According to the critics, the author should have used the play to strengthen the prestige of the trade union among the worker-audiences as well as to emphasize the "heroic" qualities of the leading protagonist, a Communist cadre. The portrayal of the Party cadre P'eng Kang in the play was deemed incorrect, "for the Party's leadership is invariably collective, but in the play P'eng seems to be quite alone." The play was thus rated "of low educational value." The author of the story, "Old Worker Ku Fu-shan," was reprimanded because he "not only distorts the image of a model Party member but also completely ignores the function of Party training and leadership."

The classic example of Communist literary and artistic criticsm involves the 1951 Shanghai-produced film, "Wu Hsün Chuan," based on the life of an advocate of free education from Shantung Province. Wu Hsün was born into a poor family and had no formal education. In order to help children attend school, he dedicated himself to hard work and frugal living; and by shrewd investment of his savings, he succeeded in accumulating funds for the education of the poor. Wu Hsün's contribution to Chinese education was never questioned until the Communist critics attacked

538 668 the film. Wu's effort for the kind of education prevalent at his time, according to the Communist critics, only strengthened the feudal order and arrested the forces of progress; rather than serving as an "accomplice" of the Manchu ruling order, the critics said, Wu should have joined the revolutionary force, i.e., the Taiping revolutionaries. Furthermore, they said, Wu Hsün's means of accumulating wealth was indicative of his subservience to the rich and of his exploitation of the poor.[6]

The evolution of criticism of the film "Wu Hsün Chuan" is illustrative of the nature of Communist literary and artistic criticism. Adverse opinions of the film were not initiated by literary and art circles, but by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In fact, the film had been very enthusiastically received, even by many eminent Communists. On May 20, 1951, the Peking People's Daily, an organ of the Central Committee of the Party, published an editorial alluding to this state of affairs. "Some comrades say that they have already mastered Marxism, but confronted with concrete issues, they completely lose their critical sense." The "Party life" column of the same issue ordered all Communists to join in criticism of "Wu Hsün Chuan." On June 4, a directive of the Ministry of Education of the People's Government,

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[6] The most representative voice of this kind is Ai Ch'ing's article "Oppose the Slave Ideology of Wu Hsün in People's Literature, June 1, 1951, pp. 9-10.

538 published in the People's Daily, instructed all 668 personnel in education throughout the nation to carry out discussions of the film. On August 4, the final and definitive verdict on the film was delivered by Chou Yang, the vice-minister of Cultural Affairs of the Communist Government. He labeled the film as unrealistic art and a product of anti-historical and anti-popular ideology.[7] Party organs in all parts of China where "Wu Hsün Chuan" had been shown used the film as a target for ideological propaganda. The ideology of the film was also discussed at the third session of the first National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which met from October 23 to November 1, 1951. Members of the All-China Federation of the Literary and Art Circles began to echo the view of the Central Committee of the Party and confessed that, while they had made definite progress in the past two years, nevertheless they always fell behind the development of Chinese society. This confession led the writers to "plunge" into study in an effort to "remold their ideology and to sharpen their critical sense."

The conflict between critical and creative forces also manifests itself in the bulk of incongruous writings of the literary critics in Communist China. The critics have ready an abundance of clichés, jargon, and theories of socialist realism which are clearly ill-digested and are

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[7] Current Background, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, No. 113, September 1, 1951.

538 used with little discrimination or literary skill. 668 Quotations from Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Gorky, Zhadanov are frequent but are not integrated into the theme of the text. Even Communist critics have noted that many quotations for orthodox Marxist texts are either irrelevant or superfluous.[8] This excessive verbalism at the expense of content makes literary criticism irreconcilable with the alleged theory of its essentially didactic function. Much criticism is lukewarm and stereotyped, written by writers who are called upon by the Communists to undertake the task of attacking their fellow writers. In this case, what is criticized is invariably the "petty bourgeois standpoint." The exception to the rule is Mao Tse-tung himself, who, from his position of absolute authority, can write criticism which is non-imaginative, forceful, and pointed, even by the standards of the free world. Top Communists, like, Liu Shao-ch'i, for example, who seem to be more confident in translating Marxism into practice, do not quote from orthodox texts as often or use as many clichés as the lesser Communists.

Since 1949, Chinese Communist literature appears to have concentrated on a number of well-defined themes. It has been most concerned with the individual under the Communist system and the problems confronting him. These have included the social confusion of the New Democratic period, the doubts of the intellectuals, the "criminal activities of the bourgeois merchants, the struggle against the "enemy of the people," and the appearance of human types based on the newly created Communist "tradition." Even the "return to history" is oriented for the solution of certain present-day problems.[9] Patriotism, aetheticism, and naturalism are all good literary themes, provided they are imbued with the spirit of "socialist 538 668●

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[8] Shen Ch-chung, "The Popularization of Theoretical Criticism of Literature and Art," People's Literature, No. 9, July 1, 1950, pp. 27-28.

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[9] Writers are told to find evidence in history of the excellent qualities of the Chinese people, and to appreciate and to learn the beautiful styles in Chinese literary heritage. For instance, the poet Li Po (A. D. 701-762) who was an incorrigible individualist, can now be safely described as a "great patriot," for Li Po "could not have written such beautiful verses about the magnificent rivers and mountains of his fatherland had he not been very patriotic." His many lyric poems which sang praises of the bright moon are now interpreted to mean his longing for a "cleaner" world, and therefore indicate his personal integrity; his mild protests against the conditions of his time are now interpreted to mean his progressive spirit. (Wang Yao, *Li Po*, Shanghai, Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1955.) Ch'ü Yuan, the poet-statesman of the Kingdom of Ch'u in the Chan-kuo period (481-221 B.C.), is praised for his "patriotism and sympathy for the common people." (Kuo Mo-jo, "A Brief Account on Ch'ü Yuan," *People's Literature*, No. 44, 1953.) Emperors like Han Kao-tsu and T'ang T'ai-tsung, who increased the national territory and the prestige of the Chinese people, are now praised as heroic. This salvaging of national characters and literature for Communist posterity could be a sign of a felt need. There are reports that since the

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538 realism," which is belief in the inevitability
668 of the development of socialism.

Since 1949, China's best writers have not produced any first-rate work. If there happen to be interesting writings that suit the taste of the reader, they do not fit into the theoretical scheme of the Party. Hsiao Yeh-mu's short story, "Between Us, Husband and Wife," for instance, was criticized as "employing the intellectual's viewpoint and taste to distort the image of the working masses and to vulgarize things political."

Some writers are unable to find publishers for their work, not because the work is counterrevolutionary but because its theme is considered untimely. In 1952, Miao Yen-hsiu was advised not to publish his Maio-chia Feng-kuang, a long poem about freedom of love and marriage in Miao communities, because the Communists did not think a celebration of the equality of the sexes useful to the Communist revolution at that time.

[No. 9 continued]
Party came to the cities it has neglected to supply enough reading material for the people in the old Liberated Areas, and that the people have gone back to the old novels. In order that they may not be "poisoned" by the "feudalistic ideas" in the old novels, the reinterpretation of the characters in old novels according to dialectical materialism seems far more necessary than the writing of novels of comparable stature.

538 Romantic novels of love and sophisticated
668 novels of human relationships are not published. When love does come into the scene, it is shown as subsidiary to other, more "worthy" and "unselfish" problems (i.e., problems social and political).

Although the writer may desire to let human relationships play a decisive part in the development of his material, there is a tendency to utilize abstract characters rather than vivid personalities. Most of the writers who choose to deal with the exposure of corruption and the excesses and tyranny of established institutions are more adept at portraying "negative" personalities than creating "positive" personalities in keeping with the Communists' view of the "heroes" of the new regime. This is true, despite the fact that Communist leaders have repeatedly told the writers "to give the most important position in the plot to the affirmative man," and that "in no case should evil be vividly presented, lest virtue remain an abstraction," for it is now the writers' task to describe the bright possibilities of life under the Communist leadership.

The recent development of literature and art in China seems to parallel that in Soviet Russia. In China, the emphasis to praise industrial and agricultural heroes follows the pattern of Soviet literature. The influence of the war in Korea upon literature in China is comparable to the influence of World War II upon Russian

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538 literature. Now that we hear about the "thaw"
668 in Russian literature,[10] can we anticipate a similar development in China? Hu Feng's attempt in early 1955[11] to liberate literature from the shackle of politics, although it ended in failure and personal disgrace, indicates, nevertheless, conscious recognition by a group of writers of the freedom necessary for the creation of works of art.[12] Only general discussion of minor ways to improve literature has been undertaken by leading authors like Mao Tun and Ai Ch'ing, and all discussions are prefaced by fervent dedications to the Marxist-Leninist world outlook. While the parallel we draw of the developmentof literature in the two countries may aid in the understanding of certain similarities, the parallel is not complete. If we compare the contents of the first six issues of People's Literature (October 1949 to April 1950) with six issues published in the first six months of 1955, we find a noticeable change; the percentage of creative writing by Chinese has increased, and the percentage of works translated from the Russian has decreased. Among the translated works, the percentage from Soviet Russia is smaller than it was; and there is now a sampling of literature from non-Communist sources, including, surprisingly enough, the tales of Hans Christian Andersen.

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[10] Walter Z. Laqueur, "Russia in Flux, I. The 'Thaw' and After," Encounter, London, October 1955, p. 35.

[11] Hu Feng is a well-known Communist writer, and was the protégé of the Communists' "literary saint" Lu Hsün.

[12] Laqueur, op. cit., p. 35.

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665 One significant development in the control of education by the Communist government is the role played by the Party. Although the official chain of control as shown in Chart 3 seems to have no place for the Communist Party, Party branches on all levels are actually the authorities for interpretation of official policy and have the final decision on how a school should be run. Evidence shows that some schools report every important question to the local Party secretary before taking any action.[21] Close-range Party supervision, together with the assignment of well trained veteran cadres to key positions on the administrative staff of the school, serve to maintain the Communists' control over the educational system.

III. MAJOR MOVEMENTS LAUNCHED BY COMMUNIST IN EDUCATION

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A. "Thought Reform"

668 To effect an ideological revolution among the educators and students is an essential step in the Communist plan to "Sovietize" the educational system in China. Since 1949, every major measure adopted by the Peking regime

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[21] People's Education, Dec. 1954, p. 30.

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in the cultural and educational fields involves, either implicitly or explicitly, an effort to remold the thought of the people concerned. However, an organized drive to change the way of thinking of the educators and students did not begin until Premier Chou En-lai delivered his speech on September 29, 1951. He urged the educators to abandon their attitude of "study for study's sake" or "art for art's sake" and to step down from their professorial pedestals to serve the masses. He exhorted the students to forget about personal profit and to identify their ambitions with the national interest.

This movement spread rapidly. Criticism and self-criticism were encouraged. "Petit bourgeois sentimentalism," "capitalistic romanticism," "feudalistic individualism," and a host of other "undesirable" attitudes were subject to relentless attack. During subsequent months the Communist press was crowded with signed confessions of past ideological erros. This is the mainstay of the Communist program to revamp education, but it is admittedly a most trying task which requires a long-range plan and sustained effort for its achievement.

Although practically every college professor in China has published his self-criticism (some of them have done so several times) and every student has been through at least one "thought struggle," the movement continues unabated. The Ministry of Education

871 668 in announcing the tasks for 1954 again pointed out the need for continued vigilance against the "remnant of feudalistic thought."[22] The State Council in directing secondary schools to improve their courses stressed the importance of strengthening socialist thought.[23] The latest revival of this issue occurred when the philosophy and works of Hu Shih, Yü P'ing-po, and Hu Feng became the subject of a purge.[24] (See chapter on Artistic and Intellectual Expression.)

B. Labor-education Movement

The labor-education movement is designed to inculcate a respect for labor in the minds of intellectuals and youth. (This is not to be confused with "Reform-through-labor" discussed in the chapter on Forced Labor.) Instruction begins in kindergarten, where the Communists teach pupils to respect the "fruits of labor," to care for school property, and to aid their parents in the work at home and in the fields. Grade school children are given manual work, partly as physical exercise and

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[22] People's Education, March 1954, p. 22.

[23] Ibid., July 1954, p. 16.

[24] People's Education, May 1955, p. 5.

871 668 partly as a means to cultivate respect for labor. Older students are urged to prepare themselves for work on the farm or in the factory. Such a preparation, the Communists say, is the "most glorious" assignment which can be given "New China's" youth. Students in advanced schools are reminded of their duty to accept government assignments regardless of the working conditions involved or the separation from familiar places it may entail. The main purpose of the labor-education movement is to prepare students for work upon the completion of any of the several levels of education.

"Study is the only task worth undertaking, and all other professions are beneath it" is a traditional Chinese expression which upholds the high social status of the educated. This has become a target of Communist attack, and the fight to change the minds of the people is still surging.[25]

C. Physical Education Movement

Although a specific commission has been established to promote physical education (see Chart 3),[1] the State Council and the two

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[25] See Communist official directives on "labor-education," ibid., June 1954, p. 7; May 1954, p. 7.

[1] [facing p. 285--Analyst]

● 668 ministries of education have been seriously
87/ concerned with the health of students. This concern originates from Mao Tse-tung's instructions to promote "good health, good study, and good work." In April 1951, Tung Ch'un-ts'ai, Vice-Minister of Education, called the attention of the nation's educators to the importance of guarding the health of students. Tung's declaration was affirmed by other officials in responsible positions during subsequent years, but apparently the situation was not much improved. The students remained in financial straits while the pressure of intensified courses was increased. The Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Health, and the Commission on Physical Education issued a joint directive in July 1954 reiterating an earlier announcement by the Government Administration Council on "Decisions for Improving the Health of Students in Schools at All Levels."[26] However, it is obvious that stress on physical exercise alone cannot take the place of an adequte diet.

Other movements launched simultaneously with the above-mentioned drives have been revived from time to time. They are indicative of the ills plaguing the educational system under

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[26] People's Education, Aug. 1954, p. 65.

668 the Communists in China. Language reform,
871 important to primary education and in efforts to combat illiteracy, is associated with "thought reform." The program to establish winter schools, summer schools, and other special training classes for peasants, workers, and soldiers is actually a part of school reorganization. Some of the most important characteristics of these movements will be discussed.

IV. SCHOOLS ON VARIOUS LEVELS

The Communist policy for education and the movements in education are nationwide, and are subject to only minor regional variations. However, a survey of the schools in Southwest China may reveal the extent to which the Communist policy has been carried out and the response of the people in this region.

A. Kindergartens and Primary Schools

872 The development of kindergartens in the Southwest China Region followed the basic policies laid down by the Communists: to consolidate the existing schools and improve their efficiency before building new schools. The program was tied in with the child welfare program and there has been no specific discussion on the progress made in Southwest China. According to Ch'u T'u-nan, Chairman

872 of the Cultural and Educational Commission for Southwest China, the emphasis in educational development in that region immediately after the Communist seizure of power in 1949 was to "build and strengthen a few institutions of higher learning and middle schools."[27] Obviously the expansion of kindergartens in Southwest China was to come later.

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668 The development of primary schools received prompter attention than did the development of the kindergarten system. The policy has been to strengthen the primary schools in cities and important villages and to encourage the villagers in outlying districts to establish their own primary schools under local government supervision.[28] To consolidate Party control over these numerous primary schools scattered over wide areas, the Government Administration Council in Peking ordered the assignment of experienced political cadres to supervise the educational agencies in county governments.

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[27] Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien, 1950 [Compendium of Government Reports 1950], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, p. 1,000.

[28] Jen-min Shou-ts'e 1955 [People's Handbook, 1955], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, pp. 575-76.

872 668 In addition, primary school principals and other administrators were indoctrinated. By September 1952, over 16,000 primary school teachers had gone through the "thought reform" process in Southwest China. Refresher courses were arranged during summer and winter vacations and other off-duty hours to improve the qualifications of primary school teachers; over 18,000 teachers were reported to have attended these courses before the end of 1952.[29]

872 In 1950, there were 76,000 primary schools in Southwest China with a total registration of 5,000,000 students. By September 1952, the total enrollment of primary schools in this region had increased to 7,167,000, or about half of the number of school-age children in Southwest China. Of these students, nearly 90 per cent were from peasant and worker families.[30] The Communists pointed out the high percentage of "proletarian" students in primary schools as a proof of the improved educational opportunity for the working class.

One of the most difficult problems in improving the primary school system was the fact the teachers were dissatisfied because they

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[29] Pei Kuan-chin T'ieh-mu hou Ti Hsi-nan [Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1954, pp. 17-19.

[30] Ibid.

873 called Elementary Darwinism. To the social sciences courses was added a study of the Common Program, later replaced by a study of the new Constitution of 1954 after its promulgation. During the past five years there have been times when a scheduled course was suspended at the last minute because the official textbook for the course was not ready.[41] Many textbooks were revised several times to measure up to the changing Party line as interpreted by Peking.

C. Institutions of Higher Learning

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668 In principle, the control of institutions of higher learning is centralized under the Ministry of Higher Education, except for the teacher's training program which falls under the Ministry of Education (see Chart 3).[1] In practice, the Government Administration Council has instructed the various central government ministries in charge of various industries to "supervise and co-ordinate" the programs for advanced technical schools. These central government ministries in turn can appoint local government personnel to take charge of the schools in order to maintain close supervision.

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[41] People's Education, Aug. 1954, pp. 63-64.

[1] [facing. p. 285 -- Analyst]

873 668 In this connection, local governments, mainly provincial, are given the responsibility of providing the schools with political guidance.[42] With this system of control, the political conversion of the universities and colleges was carried out with very little delay. In September 1950, the regional authorities of Southwest China called a conference on higher education. Immediately after the conference, the 43 existing institutions of higher learning were put through the initial "reform." As a part of the "thought reform," 808 college teachers and 5,212 students were enlisted to serve in the Land Reform Movement. In the summer of 1951, 191 teachers and 1,640 students were sent to farms and factories to practice what they had been learning in school.[43]

873 Among the more acute difficulties

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[42] "Decisions Concerning the Revision of Relations of Leadership for Institutions of Higher Learning," announced by the Government Administration Council on Oct. 6, 1953; People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 558-59.

[43] New China Daily, Chungking, Sept. 30, 1952, p. 3.

771 got "rights" of religious and missionary
648 activity which no strong Chinese government would ever have granted. But the rise of nationalist sentiment brought with it hatred of foreigners and of their religions -- hatred that exploded repeatedly in anti-foreign, anti-Christian riots.[1]

Meanwhile another trend was visible. Religious groups and a number of outstanding political leaders began to feel that China could not become truly modern and western unless it was reformed from the moral base upward; religion accounted for the power and success of
771 Western nations. Would not a religion -- a
668 religioned Confucianism, a revitalized Buddhism, or even Christianity -- bring about that basic transformation that China clearly needed?

This view was rejected by two overlapping groups which had decisive power in state and society after 1925. The first were the intellectual leaders, increasingly committed to some form of materialistic philosophy -- a philosophy which held all religion to be parasitic, corrosive

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[1] Tatsuro and Sumiko Yamamoto, "The Anti-Christian Movement in China," Far Eastern Quarterly, Feb. 1953, pp. 133-47.

771/668 and "non-progressive."[2] The second group was the Kuomintang elite, many of whom derived their anti-religious views from the intellectual leadership. For others in the Kuomintang elite the older Confucian view of religions, reinforced by nationalist feeling, reasserted itself; consciously or unconsciously they reverted to the view that no strong self-respecting government should tolerate independent religious bodies that challenged the government's right to control all aspects of public and private life.

771/777 Religions in the twentieth century were caught in this crossfire of negative sentiment and attack. To modernize and to become militant was to provoke state suppression, and the effort of religious leaders to stem the rising tide of intellectual materialism failed.[3] In the countryside the old folk religions -- varieties of Buddhism and Taoism -- continued to wither away. Christianity made some advances, but it was always tainted by its foreignness, by the fact that its missionaries came with the backing of the Western powers which held China in thrall.

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2. O. Brière, "Les courant philosophiques en Chine depuis 50 ans," Bulletin de l'université de l'Aurore, No. 40, 1947, pp. 561-654.
3. O. Brière, op. cit., passim.

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668 Communist policy towards religion is in many ways the culmination of the trends we have described. It reflects the triumph of materialist philosophy and the imposition of materialism as *the* intellectual orthodoxy. It is highly nationalistic and anti-foreign and thus insists that all religious organizations cease receiving support from abroad and assert their distinctive Chinese character. It carries forward, through the most effective apparatus of control and coercion that China has seen, the confiscation of church property and the secularization of the clergy. The Communist Constitution provides that "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have freedom of religious belief."[4] This means, in practice, that people of various religious persuasions are *allowed* a limited and shrinking area of belief and action by an authoritarian government which reserves the fundamental right to control all education, communication, and public and private morality. On the grounds of anti-superstition, anti-imperialism, and anti-feudalism, the government and Party move steadily, with only occasional tactical retreats, towards the liquidation of religion in China.

Both pre-Communist trends and Communist policies should be kept in mind as we consider religion in the Southwest China Region.

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[4] Article 88, Ch. III.

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Province	Lay Adherents	Modern Organizations
Szechwan	490,700	190
Yunnan	36,130	1
Kweichow	2,730	17

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Such Buddhist schools and institutes as had survived have been taken over by the Communists. Buddhist periodicals have been stopped in Chungking and elsewhere, and publishing houses closed. The Han-Tibetan College in Chungking, along with other Buddhist colleges, has been closed. Two Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines have appeared, one in Peking, one in Shanghai; they are devoted to reconciling Buddhism and Marxism.[1] A new Chinese Buddhist Association was formed in Peking in November 1952, with several leading Buddhist scholars among its leaders.[17] Unlike the earlier Buddhist Association, which was organized by Buddhists to reform and defend

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16. Atrocities. According to this report the circulation of Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines is very limited.

17. According to Buddhism in China, Peking, Nationalities Publishing House, 1955, p. 2, the effective date of organization was June 1953, when 93 persons representing "the monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen of different nationalities and Buddhist schools of the various regions" were elected to serve as its board of directors.

779 their faith, the new body is sponsored, organized,
668 and manipulated by the state and the Party. In China's relations with the Buddhist countries of Asia, it will be used as a propaganda device to allay their fear that China is an enemy of Buddhism; it will also be used to "soothe" and control Buddhist populations in Mongolia, the former Sikang province, and Tibet.[18] Domestically, the new association, like all others in Communist China, will be used primarily for the indoctrination and control of its members. As early as May 1951, a central committeeman of the Party outlined the chief tasks for Chinese Buddhists: (1) participation in land reform, (2) opposition to counterrevolutionaries, (3) participation in the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and (4) recognition of the duty to construct a new religion in the new society.[19]

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18. The Dalai Lama, the Panchen Ngoerhtehni, the Chagan Kogen of Inner Mongolia, and the Venerable Hsu Yun have been chosen as honorary presidents of the Buddhist Association. Cf., Buddhism in China, p. 20. A photograph in the same volume shows an encampment of Tibetan tribesman in Sikang listening to a lama's sermon. Another shows a Southern Buddhist temple in the Tai Autononous area in Yunnan.

19. Richard Walker, China Under Communism, New Haven, 1955, pp. 188-89.

[redacted]

779 the development of any social, educational, or medical program. (Efforts along these lines proved abortive.) Taoist temples have been steadily secularized, and the Communist will complete this process. The Communists them-
779 selves recognize that "Religious Taoism" is
668 dead. In 1949, when bidding for the support of religious groups, they invited representatives of Buddhism, Protestantism, and Islam to the People's Political Consultative Conference but no representative of Taoism.[29]

779 Folk Taoism in the present study includes all of the local cults and practices that have, for millenia, been characteristic of the villages of China. Organized Taoism in many respects, simply magnified and encompassed a wide variety of folk cults, giving this amalgam some of the trappings of an organized "religion." Folk Taoism, like organized Taoism, has been in a long slow decline. The gods of its pantheon have been increasingly neglected; the shrines and temples in the towns and villages have fallen into neglect. The arrival of modern school teachers, the appearance, even occasional, of effective modern doctors have steadily undermined belief in the efficacy of magic, alchemy,

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[29] Chan, op. cit., p. 146.

575 strong political function as a focus of anti-dynastic and anti-official sentiment and activity; they made a notable contribution to the victory of the republicans in 1911. Yet Sun Yat-sen found them unmanageable political allies, and by 1930 Chiang Kai-shek -- despite whatever support he may have derived from them in his seizure of power in 1927 -- began to campaign against them.[33] This was interrupted by his campaigns against the Communists and his preparations to resist the Japanese.

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668 The Communist regime obviously will not tolerate any such closed, self-supporting, potentially subversive groups, and a series of campaigns has been carried out against them. At the end of a major drive in 1953, P'eng Chen reported that "four million duped members had withdrawn from these reactionary sects and societies and that the battle was essentially won."[34] That his claims of victory were premature is suggested by a recent report of the dissolution of five secret society

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[33] Cf. B. Favre, Les Sociétés Secrètes en Chine, Paris, 1933, p. 177.

[34] NCNA dispatch of Sept. 18, 1953, quoted in Walker, China Under Communism, p. 189.

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575 organizations in the vicinity of Kalgan. The
668 report accused the societies of elaborate clandestine organizations, hidden headquarters, an elaborate hierarchy of leadership, and efforts to infiltrate Communist organizations.[35] (The societies' power of resistance are discussed in the chapter on Subversive Potentialities.)

575 Secret societies have been particularly numerous and powerful in North China, but those which have had important followings in Southwest China might be mentioned here:

1. Hung-chiang hui. The Society of Redspears, an offshoot of Pai-lien chiao, the White Lotus Society. Once powerful in the north, since 1924 it has been active in Kiangsu, Hupeh, Hunan, and -- in Southwest China -- in Szechwan.[36]

2. Ko-lao hui. The Society of the Elders. It is somewhat more religious than other societies, has a history of resistance to government. Founded in Fukien, has been

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[35] NCNA, June 16, 1955; SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

[36] Chan, op. cit., pp. 158-59; Encyclopedia of China Problems, p. 480.

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Province	Pop. in Millions	Moslems	Mosques
Szechwan	48.	2,615,330	2,279
Yunnan	15.	4,567,290	3,971
Kweichow	14.3	519,160	449

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668 Islam in modern times has manifested some of the tendencies which Buddhism showed under the impact of various modernizing forces. One of these was the tendency for lay leaders to rise in influence over the Ahung. Another was the foundation of a Chinese Islamic Association in 1912 to represent the interests of all Chinese Moslems, to work for social reform, and to foster closer relations between Moslems and non-Moslems. It claimed 3,000 branches by 1923. Its successors participated in the resistance against Japan, sponsored students abroad and the importation of modern scholars of the Koran from other countries, and developed young men's associations and medical services.[47] The total effect of this activity was to foster a trend to liberality and modernity. It served also to identify the Chinese Moslems with the national aspirations of other Chinese.

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[47] Cf. Chan *op. cit.*, pp. 190-91.

779 Province led in this movement; in 1937,
563 eighteen Chinese students were sent to Egypt,
873 and half of these were from Yunnan. By 1930,
the Islamic Theological College attached to the Chungking mosque had been in operation five years, and the Chinese Islamic Association had set up or co-ordinated two hundred primary schools and twenty high schools.[49] Yet the spread of modern type education was handicapped by the poverty of the Moslem communities and by religious prejudice against Chinese learning. For example Shantien, in Yunnan, was the outstanding Islamic cultural center in China and sent more students abroad than any other town; yet in 1949 it had a population of only 5,000, of which two were college graduates and "some thirty" high school graduates; it had one grade school with 360 students but no high school.[50]

779 What have been Chinese Communist policies
668 toward the problem of Chinese Islam, a problem
that involves some areas where they are a major segment of the population and other areas where they represent a cohesive, slowly modernizing religious community? (The

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[49] Ibid., pp. 198-201.

[50] Ibid., p. 200.

policies adopted towards major centers of Moslem population, are dealt with in the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Communist religious policies toward Mohammedanism have something in common with Communist policies toward other religions. The standard pattern of organization has been established by the Peking government: An All-China Islamic Association which, it should be emphasized, differs from former organizations in being an instrument of control over Chinese Mohammedans operated by a hierarchy ideologically acceptable to the Communists. A Peking propaganda booklet issued in 1955 states that, "The work of education is really tackled seriously now, and the number of primary and secondary school pupils is now double the figure before[51] liberation. This may sound like "progress," but what it undoubtedly means is that the children of Chinese Moslems are increasingly being given the prescribed Communist education.

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51. Chinese Moslems. A NCNA dispatch dated June 9, 1955, states that Moslem students in Shanghai have increased from 290 in 1949 to 3,000. Government subsidies (and control) might account for this. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

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668 The cadre is the basic instrument for the Communization of Chinese Islam. Offering the education and prestige inducements of Party work has apparently successfully recruited cadres from among young Chinese Moslems. "In the government organs there have been many Moslem cadres. Some of them have taken up the leadership jobs. In the areas where the Moslems have been comparatively concentrated, the government has paid attention to foster the basic-level Moslem cadres."[52]

The policy of Communization is well reflected in a speech of Ma Sung-t'ing, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Moslem Cultural Association, on the occasion of the "Second Enlarged Conference" in June 1955. This conference, he said,

> "...will study how to help the government to carry out the ideological education in patriotism, national unity, and Socialist transformation among the Moslems, so as to further strengthen and consolidate national unity and continue to develop and raise the Moslem political, economic, and cultural levels in jointly carrying out the construction of the fatherland."[53]

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[52] SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

[53] NCNA dispatch, SCMP, 1067, June 11-13, 1955, p. 24.

779 668 The Chinese Communists' policy towards the Moslems has been affected by two factors which do not influence their policies towards other religions: (1) the Russian pattern of handling integrated minority groups through various types of "culturally autonomous" organizations; (2) Chinese ambitions in Islamic areas of Asia which foster tactical tolerance towards the Islamic minority in China. Thus the glamorized picture publication Chinese Moslems has texts in English, Chinese, Arabic, and Indonesian, and its introduction ends with the greeting "Salaam to all peace-loving Moslems."[54] Selections from the works of Mao Tse-tung have been translated into Arabic for the indoctrination of the Ahungs who do not read Chinese; probably these translations will be used in Indonesia and other countries where Arabic is a sacred lingua-franca. Mosques in "show" cities such as Canton, Shanghai, and Peking have been renovated and serve to demonstrate to Moslem visitors the "reality" of Communist China's promise of religious freedom.

779 563 We have little detailed and reliable information on the Islamic communities of the

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[54] Chinese Moslems, introduction.

779 The situation in 1945-46 was encouraging
797 to Chinese and foreign Catholics. The clergy
was being rapidly Sinicized, charitable work
was going forward, Catholic educational
institutions were full. Native and foreign
clergy had gained approval for their work in
the war of resistance against Japan. At the
same time there were developments which,
especially in the light of later events, promised
trouble to the Church. The exchange of
[648] envoys between the Vatican and the Nationalist
Government took place in 1946; that Bishop Paul
Yu-pin was widely believed to have strong
influence with the Nationalist Government, boded
ill for the Church when the government declined
in power. As the Communist power increased,
● 668 the persecution of the Church, begun in Com-
798 munist area in 1937, was a grim warning of
what might be in store for Chinese Catholicism
797 as a whole.[61] Catholic Action, the association
779 of enthusiastic laymen for the advancement of
the Faith, had been growing in all parts of the
country from 1928 onward; there were

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[61] Cf. Raymonde de Jaegher and I. Corbally Kuhn, Tempête sur la Chine, Paris, 1953.

668 two-hundred adult groups and thirty youth
798 groups as early as 1930.[62] In 1948 the Papal
797 Nuncio ordered the formation of the Legion
779 of Mary, a more militant, zealous, and
disciplined organization of Catholic laymen, which in many areas absorbed the Catholic Action groups. The new organization was set up by an American priest, and it had the Chinese name of Sheng-mu chün, Army, or Legion, of Mary. Many experienced Catholic missionarie were doubtful if any strong Chinese government would tolerate this type of militant organization. The group has proved of major propaganda value to the Communists and an object of their most ruthless measures of oppression.[63]

798 Communist policies and propaganda have
797 made the most of all the vulnerabilities of the
779 Chinese Catholic Church. Its foreign "imperialist" and Kuomintang connections were played

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[62] Monsterleet, p. 148. It seems to have had much less strength in the Southwest than in the major cultural and commercial centers. Cf. Monsterleet, pp. 32-33.

[63] Cf., Hsü, Hsin-Chung-kuo ti tsung-chiao ko-hsin yü-tung [The Movement for Religious Reformation in New China], Shanghai, 1951, pp. 9-13. Hereafter cited as Hsü.

744 563 claim that among minority groups in the Southwest Region, 98,406 people received free medical treatment and 72,900 people were given vaccination against smallpox.[10]

V. THE PATRIOTIC HEALTH MOVEMENT

744 668 In 1952 the Communists launched the Patriotic Health Drive. It was designed primarily to integrate health work with the mass propaganda campaign which accused the United States of engaging in bacteriological warfare. The Patriotic Health Drive was, therefore, stimulated by the conflict in Korea and became a part of the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement. In the name of patriotism the Chinese people were called upon to clean their cities and work for the general improvement of environmental hygiene.

Upon the launching of the Patriotic Health Drive in April 1952, some 70 to 80 per cent of the population in the key cities of the Southwest Region were mobilized. According to statistics released in September 1952, the following accomplishments were claimed:

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[10] *New China Daily*, Sept. 25, 1952, p. 3.

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Refuse removed		1,000,000 tons
Flies exterminated		20 tons
Fly larvae destroyed	some	70 tons
Mosquito larvae destroyed	some	23 tons
Mosquitos exterminated		190 pounds
Ditches dredged and repaired		868 miles
Rats exterminated		800,000
Rat holes sealed up		96,619
Public comfort stations improved and constructed		7,993
Wells improved and dug		9,418

The Communists claimed to have used new types of rat traps, and more efficient ways of exterminating fleas and other pests were utilized. One activist of the Patriotic Drive, it was claimed, killed 9,000 flies in a single day and on the following day surpassed his own record by killing 13,900.[11] We must assume that the New China Daily, in enthusiasm for such a display of industry, has quoted approximate figures.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

1. In 1953, the Patriotic Health Drive began earlier in the year. In many localities it was integrated with house-cleaning before the Chinese New Year. Instead of killing flies in the summer, the people were called upon to dig up and destroy fly larvae. To publicize these activities and accomplishments, the Party bureaucrats demanded further details with which to adorn their reports. One county government in Szechwan asked each village farmer to answer 120 questions. When exterminating rats, for example, the farmer was to classify them as being large, medium, or small. The weight of each rat was to be given; farmers were expected to give the length of the rats' bodies and the length of their tails.[12]

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[11] New China Daily, Sept. 26, 1952, p. 3.

[12] Ibid., June 7, 1953, p. 3.

744 668 Obviously the requirements for preparation of the reports grew ridiculous. This undue emphasis on detail, when one examines Chinese Communist statistical reports, seems to be a common failing of the bureaucratic mind. At times, the Chinese Communists themselves have criticized this frequent preoccupation with niggling details. An editorial entitled "On the Counting of Mosquitoes," which first appeared in the People's Daily (Organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), was later quoted by the New China Daily of Chungking.[13] The editorial states that acts as absurd as these should be regarded as the inevitable growing pains of a newly founded government during a period of national construction. Red tape and wasteful practices should be exposed; the value of self-criticism is not to be ignored. The editorial states, in conclusion, that both the weaknesses and strengths of Communist China should be carefully evaluated for the insight they will bring.

[[37]] 744 157 2. The southwestern provinces produce the majority of China's medicinal herbs. One of the principal tasks of the Chinese Communist health program was "to unite the strength of native and Western medicine."[14] The South-

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Survey of China Mainland Press, American Consulate-General, Hong Kong, No. 922, pp. 42-43.

731 houses were destroyed. This calamity created 120,000 refugees.[7]

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668 As if these were not enough, the people on the mainland of China were beset by a number of man-made adversities -- the land reform, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and warfare in Korea. About 90,000,000 people were affected.[8] Land Reform has been completed in 12,165 villages (about 82 per cent of the total area) in the Southwest Region, and the number of people involved in this violent change was estimated at 74,315,489, of which 3,715,774 were landowners. One estimate gives the number of casualties of these purges as follows:[9] some 2,600,000 landlords suffered from the land reform, with 148,430 put to death; some 2,500,000 died as counter-revolutionaries as the result of the Three-Anti

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[7] Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 2.

[8] Kung-fei-ti Chiu-chi Kung-tso [Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists], * The Sixth Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, Taipei, 1955, pp. 2-3.

[9] Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 2-5.

*/ Hereinafter cited as Relief Work.

731 and Five-Anti campaigns, 272,800 men were
668 mobilized and sent to fight in Korea from the four southwest provinces. Among the prisoners of war who chose to go to Formosa rather than return to Communist China, 5,184 men were from Southwest China.[10]

III. COMMUNIST RELIEF AND WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS

657 After the Hwai River flood of 1949, the
744 Central Relief Committee was formed (February 1950) under the Government Administration Council as a temporary but integral part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Later, similar committees were set up in the provinces and municipalities. Their existence, on the whole, have been in name only, and little relief work has been accomplished.[11]

During the convention of the All-China People's Relief Administration of China was organized as the successor to the China Liberated Areas Relief Administration. This was not a government department but a "People's" organization. Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun

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[10] Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[11] Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists, pp. 5-6.

527 746 children are conducted. In the period 1950-52, according to one report, more than 1,000,000 children received a health examination.[30]

In the Southwest, in Chungking, on Children's Day 1953, more than 33,000 children gathered at the "Working People's Cultural Palace." Entertainment and games were on the day's program, as well as speeches by the mayor and vice-mayor of the city. In eleven other cultural centers" in the municipality of Chungking on that same day, special motion pictures for children were shown. The New China Bookstore opened its new department for children, and on the first day a sale of more than 3,700 children's books was reported.[31]

746 668 The first conference of the workers in women's and children's welfare was convened October 3-12, 1951, under the aegis of the All-China Democratic Women's Federation. With national production as the over-all purpose, the scope of their welfare work was described as to serve the masses of working

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[30] New China Daily, May 30, 1953, p. 3.

[31] Ibid., June 2, 1953, p. 1.

746 668 ● women and their children. Their main tasks were to promote the health of women and children and to solve the problems which arise in the rearing and educating of the children of working people. At the conference it was reported that 15,700 child welfare organizations, including creches, kindergartens, and relief institutions, had been established on the China Mainland. Another report claimed that in two years (to November 1951) 4,340 persons were trained to care for children and 3,743 were trained as health workers to care for women and children. During the same period, propaganda agencies arranged 128 exhibits to promote good health among women and children; 7,295,095 people were reported to have attended these exhibits.[32]

746 By the end of 1952, there were 34,000 public health agencies for women and children, with additional mobile corps, organized under all the provincial governments. In 1952, in mining and construction work, in other enterprises, in public organizations and schools, 2,738 creches were in existence; in larger cities, 4,346 street creches were set up, and in the rural areas 148,000 creches were

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[32] Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Peking, 1951, No. 12, Dec. 1951, pp. 47-48.

665 classes were expected to attend school in the
874 evening.

The purpose of the ideological school is to train Party members, candidates for membership, and leaders of mass organizations. Located in Chungking, the Southwestern ideological school is under the joint control of the Southwest Party Bureau and the Chungking Municipal Party Committee. Together with its 108 branch schools, it trained some 80,000 people in 1952. Instructors are trained in two special schools, where they study such things as Party history, the Party Constitution, and Soviet works on economic reconstruction.[25]

H. Affiliated Party Organizations

668 The Party attempts to utilize the enthusiasm of youth through two organizations which, although not a part of the Party, are under its supervision: the New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC) and its subordinate group, the Young Pioneers, for youths aged

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[25] New China Daily, Jan. 17, 1953, p. 1.

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9 to 15. The Young Pioneers are subordinates of the Youth Corps, looking to the latter for leadership and guidance.

1. New Democratic Youth Corps

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668 The Party controls the NDYC through the Southwest China Working Committee of the corps. The constitution of the corps assures the Party of effective control.[26] It permits Party members to be in charge of corps above the county level, thus placing the direction of corps activities in the hands of the Party. The first function of the corps is to provide a reservoir of potential new Party members; for example, the corps contributed the highest number of new Party members during the 1952 membership drive.[27] Its second task is to supply needed activists in all organizations, particularly in the factories and rural communities. In Chungking, for example, corps units are maintained in all

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[26] The Chinese text of the Constitution of the NDYC and Li Ch'ang's explanatory report in People's Daily, July 7, 1953, pp. 1, 3. English text in Current Background, No. 258, Sept. 10, 1953.

[27] New China Daily, Nov. 3, 1952, p. 1; Oct. 11, 1952, p. 3.

883 organizations.[28] The final task of the corps
668 is to engage in the broadest possible range of activities in order to reach segments of society which have no Party organizations. In 1952, when Party organizations were small and relatively ineffective in the Southwest, the NDYC had 440,000 members. Thus, it paved the way for the sharp increase in Party membership that took place after that date.

The organization of the corps follows that of the Party. Prior to 1955, a Southwest China Working Committee of the NDYC was established to serve as the representative of the Central Committee of the NDYC. Local corps organizations on provincial, municipal, and county levels are empowered to establish representative committees in the administrative districts and ch'ü.

With the exception of those working committees on administrative-district and ch'ü levels, the constituent corps organizations rest upon a dual authority. Each level has a congress and a committee elected by it. These committees are the executive organs of the corps and their component members are approved by the upper-level committee.

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[28] Ibid., Oct. 21, 1951, p. 3.

The corps branch, like the Party branch, is an essential link with the population as a whole. It may be formed in any factory, mine, enterprise, farm station, village, government agency, company of the armed forces, school, or street where there are three or more corps members. A general corps branch and corps committee can be formed, depending upon the size of the branch. These basic-level agencies of the corps serve to mobilize youth and the masses and also may take over Party functions where Party agencies are inadequate.

The New Democratic Youth Corps has at least 3,000,000 more members than the Party itself. However, it is not an organization with political power; it is rather the instrument through which the Party exercizes control over youth, and, more particularly, over youth organizations in the militia, the army, and the schools.

2. The Young Pioneers Chapter 7 of the constitution of the corps governs the

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883 668 relationship between the corps and the Young Pioneers.[29] The pioneers are completely subordinate to the corps and their regional influence is far less apparent. Earlier, the pioneers concentrated upon the promotion of patriotic fervor among the youth between the ages of nine and fifteen; since 1953 they have placed increasing emphasis on cultural education. In October 1952 there were 183,000 Young Pioneers in Southwest China. Since that time efforts have been made to acquire additional members in rural areas.[30] National membership now stands at 70 million, about 15 per cent of the youth in that age group.[31]

II. POLITICAL CONTROLS

668 The Party has consolidated its power by a network of controls not only over Party agencies but over all bureaucratic, military. public security, and mass organizations. The control is maintained by placing members of the Communist Party of China in key positions in all these organizations, by reserving all policy-making decisions to the Party, and

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[29] Chinese text of the Regulations of the Young Pioneers, People's Daily, June 1, 1954, p. 2.

[30] New China Daily, Oct. 7, 1952, p. 6.

[31] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], March 14, 1955, p. 1.

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● 668 by agitation to arouse popular enthusiasm in favor of the Party

A. Party Controls Over Government Organs

1. Party and Government Fusion.

Control of government organs has been accomplished primarily by the fusion of government and Party in authority, in functions, and in personnel at all levels and in all spheres of political activity. Two systems, the report and the inspection system, have been introduced into all Party organizations in order to facilitate this fusion. The former requires that all Party organizations periodically report to and seek instructions from Party units at a higher level. The latter directs high level Party units to check regularly on the conduct of subordinate units.

Another powerful means of control is the placing of Party members in key administrative positions. On the regional level, for example, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the First Secretary of the Southwest China Party Bureau, served concurrently as deputy chairman of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee between 1950 and 1952. The several committee

668 chairmen under the regional government also were Party secretaries, thus holding key positions in both hierarchies. One example is Sun Chih-yüan, who served concurrently as Secretary General of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee and as Secretary of the Party Military and Political Committee.

The pattern on the provincial level is similar. Li Ching-ch'üan, First Secretary of the Szechwan Communist Party, formerly served as chairman of the Szechwan provincial government. Liao Chih-kao and Hsieh Fu-chih held similar positions in Sikang and Yunnan, respectively. At present, the newly elected governors generally are second secretaries of their branch Parties; however, all real power has been retained by the first secretaries.

At lower levels this fusion is even more frequent.

2. Cadre Utilization. A second method through which the Party exercises control over state organs is the appointment of

•668 faithful and capable cadres (Party members as well as non-Party members) to serve in the rank and file of judicial and administrative organizations.[32] Party secretaries in charge of Party personnel are appointed to head the personnel offices of the government organizations. For example, in 1952 Yü Chiang-chen, the chief of the Department of Organization of the Southwest Party Bureau, was appointed director of the Department of Personnel in the regional government. In Szechwan, An Fa-hsiao, head of the Department of Personnel in the provincial government, served concurrently as deputy chief of the Department of Organization of the provincial Party Committee.[33]

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[32] For a discussion of the Party's role in the control of state organs, see Hsiung Hsi-yüan, People's Daily, November 18, 1954, p. 3; for definition and the utilization of cadre, see Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Cambridge, M.I.T., 1942, ii.

[33] A list of the members of the Szechwan Provincial Government can be found in New China Daily, Nov. 18, 1952, p. 1.

After the Constitution was promulgated, all government personnel offices of the central and provincial governments were disbanded. This may mean even firmer Party control of personnel policy.

3. The Department of Supervision and Other Instruments of Control. One of the most common and effective instruments of Party control over the government is the Office of Supervision, formerly the People's Control Commission. It is found at all levels from the central government down to the county government. This system of control should be distinguished from the judicial agencies of control, namely, the People's procuratorates, and from the public security agencies.[34] Supervisory offices of all levels and in all organizations are strictly controlled by the Party. As a rule, heads of these offices are either Party secretaries or chiefs of public security agencies. Personnel working in these offices are usually activists, who, like the members of the Party, only carry out Party directives.

The offices of supervision check the execution of government policies directed

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[34] *Discussions of judicial and public-*security organs will be found in later studies.

G68 against officials guilty of misdemeanors, disobedience, and corruption. Unlike the People's procuratorates, they check only government employees.[35]

The highest supervisory agency is the Southwest People's Control Commission. Control branches have been established in state enterprises, financial and economic offices, transportation agencies, notably railways, and post offices.[36] At the provincial level, such offices are formed within each department and bureau dealing with financial and economic matters. From two to four workers are employed in each branch.

The work of the supervisory offices in the region is co-ordinated with the major yearly drives. The tasks for the nation in 1955 are the elimination of nationwide waste, corruption, and degeneration within the government.[37]

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[35] T'an Cheng-wen's article in "Chien-ch'üan Jen-min Chien-ch'a Chih-tu, Kung-ku Kuo-chia Fa-chih," ["Construct a People's Protectorate and Reinforce State Judicial System"], New China Monthly, No. 2., Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 28-29.

[36] People's Daily, Jan. 6, 1953, p. 1.

[37] Kuang-ming Jih-pao, June 13, 1955, p.3.

668 People's supervisory reporters are sent out by the supervisory commission or selected within the organization itself. They are organized into small working broups to spy on the individual worker for evidence of misdemeanors, waste, corruption, bureaucratic attitudes, and other behavior not in the "best interest" of the State. Their techniques are varied. They may make direct accusations, establish a network of mass contact, spy on their own colleagues, tamper with People's complaint boxes, and control the hearings of the "reception room." The complaint boxes are used to encourage accusations and complaints against officials and agencies. This arrangement is required in all government offices, and the head of the office is responsible for the examination of these letters and appropriate replies. The reception rrom enables people to make accusations and complaints directly to the government. In 1952 there were 749 supervisory reporters in Southwest China.[38]

B. Party Control Over Mass Organizations

Communist policies toward mass

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[38] New China Daily, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 3.

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668 organizations have been well calculated and effectively carried out. These policies encourage and regulate the activities and political utilization of mass organizations.

From the Party point of view, mass organizations are a political asset because each of these mass organizations represents a specific segment of the populace and is itself a social or economic force.

Immediately after the Communist seizure of power in this region, mass organizations sprang to life. Not until 1952, however, were mass organizations placed upon a permanent basis. There are as many mass organizations in this region as at the central level.[39] The most influential are examined to illustrate the patter of Party control.

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668 1. Trade Unions. Trade unions are regarded as the transmission belt between the Party and the workers.[40] Their

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[39] See Chao Kuo-chün, The Mass Organization in Communist China, Cambridge, Massachusetts, M.I.T., 1953.

[40] Constitution of All-China Federation of Trade Unions in People's Daily, May 14, 1953, p. 2; English text in Current Background, No. 248, June 22, 1953.

organization is patterned after that of the Party. A branch office of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions has been set up in the Southwest. Under this regional office, local trade union councils stretch from provinces, municipalities, and counties to towns. Since farmers and handicraft workers are ineligible, hsiang are not included.

The establishment of Party control over the trade unions in Southwest China did not prove to be an easy task. A sweeping and drastic campaign was required before control was comfortably secured. The "democratic reform" campaign, launched in 1951, was directed at the trade unions and was aimed at the liquidation of the old trade union leadership and the strengthening of the Party's hold on the urban population.[41]

To facilitate the Party's political control of trade unions, there is a basic trade union branch or cell, similar to the Party branch, composed of the trade union members working in the same enterprise. If the branch is of sufficient size, this basic trade union committee will set up a workshop (department) committee. The trade union

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41. Reports of the campaign are printed in the following issues of the New China Daily, Nov. 24, 1951, p. 2; Nov. 25, 1951, p. 1; Jan. 1, 1952, p. 3.

467 committee may be divided into trade union
668 teams according to production units. The general methods employed by the Party for political control of other organizations are applicable here. Trade union affairs are subject to the direction of the Party commission on trade unions; and Party members are placed in key positions within the unions.

However, the most effective method is the initiation of union policies in the Party rather than in the union.[42] This involves three steps: first, the Party branch within the union initiates major policies, including directives, working plans, and cadre policy. Secondly, the Party branch suggests to the presidium of the Trade Union Council policies in need of discussion. Party members elected to the presidium direct the trade union meeting and successfully guide the Party proposal through the presidium. Third, after the resolution is adopted, Party and corps members must accept it unconditionally and serve as activists to make certain that it is carried out.

668 2. Federation of Democratic Women. By October 1951 almost one-third of the women of Southwest China had become

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[42] People's Daily, May 8, 1953, p. 2.

668 members of the Federation of Democratic Women and its affiliates.[43] The federation's importance in the region, however, is not based solely on the large size of its membership. The position of women in society is such that they not only constitute an important part of the labor force, but also exert a profound influence on the entire population. The Communists correctly regard the federation as a major political force and are most eager to see that women's organizations are formed.

At the village level, the federation plays the most active role in the rural movement. The wide participation of women in the Peasants' Association should be noted. In October 1951 there were 7,700,000 women enrolled in Southwestern associations. The federation plays a political role in all the farm drives and gives full support to the hsiang governments and party apparatus. Since the completion of land reform, women have begun to take an active part in the producers' co-operatives. In May 1954, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women held its first "rural work meeting" and called upon all women on the farms of China to join the movement.[44]

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[43] People's Daily, May 9, 1953, p. 2.

In the cities, women are important to the urban inhabitants' committees and the worker's family committees, both Party devices for urban control. Apart from participation in all drives in the cities -- notably the "democratic reform" movement and Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns -- the Federation of Democratic Women also co-operates with the Department of Women Workers of the trade unions. In addition, it urges all women to participate in social work.

Women have played an increasingly active role within both the government and the Party. For example, the Chungking Party branch listed 5,759 women among its members.[45] Furthermore, in 1954, twenty per cent of the elected representatives of *hsiang* People's Congresses were women.[46]

Party control of women's federations follows the same pattern as that of other mass

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[44] *People's Handbook,* 1955, p. 3.
[45] *People's Daily*, March 11, 1955, p. 3.
[46] *Ibid.*, June 11, 1953, p.1.

668 organizations. The Party, as well as the New Democratic Youth Corps, maintains a commission on women's affairs. The commission has the power of direction and policy-making. However, the work of the commission is subject to the supervision of other basic departments such as the departments of organization, propaganda, rural work, and so forth. Party personnel are placed in key positions in the federations.

3. Other Mass Organizations. A number of mass organizations which have a strong influence on society are represented in this region. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth maintains branches in all key cities and counties in each province.[47] Also active is the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles. The most elaborately organized group is the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, established in 1949. By April 1951 it had 33,583 members in the Southwest.[48] Party control of these mass organizations follows the usual pattern.

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[47] Regulations governing the ACFDY can be found in the People's Daily, June 17, 1953, p. 1.

[48] Hopei Daily [Paoting], April 15, 1951, p. 1.

668 C. Political Control in the Rural Areas

The rural movement is the foundation of Communist political power in Southwest China. Here lies the strength and the weakness of the region and of the Party; here the pattern of political dynamics is most revealing and Communist power encounters the greatest opposition.

The establishment of Communist power in the rural areas can be divided into three stages: the initial construction period prior to the completion of land reform, when political power was centered in the peasants' associations and closely related to land reform in the rural areas; the consolidation period, a period of experiment for the producers' co-operative movements, marked by a gradual shift of pOlitical power from the Peasants' Association to the hsiang government, controlled by the Party; the election and the post-Constitution periods when the continuous suppression of opposition in the rural areas (during the elections of 1953-54) strengthened the foundation of Communist political power, and when such political power has been firmly entrenched in the government and the Party (during the post-Constitution period).

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1. Initial Construction: 1950-1952. Communist leaders have emphasized the political significance of land reform.[49] They regard it as a political struggle, and its essence is conceived to be the abolition of the "feudal" system of land ownership, the creation of a political force under Party control, and the establishment of "democratic authority."

Land reform is divided into three stages: preparation, execution, and re-examination. The preparatory stage is aimed at the liquidation of the existing holders of political power. The executive stage includes confiscation and redistribution of land in order to destroy the basis of the landlord class. During the re-examination period, the foundation of new political power is laid.

During the land reform period, political power in the rural area rested upon: (1) the Party, (2) the Peasants' Association, (3) the

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[49] Liu Shao-ch'i's report on land reform in *Kuang-ming Jih-pao*, June 30, 1950, p. 1; English text in *The Agrarian Law of the People's Republic of China*, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1950.

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hsiang government, (4) the militia, and (5) other mass organizations, notably the women's federations and the youth organizations.[50] Of these, the Peasants' Association and the militia, organized as instruments of terror, were of particular importance.

The Communist conquest of the Southwest was accompanied by widespread disorder and unrest. Therefore, the initial organization of peasant associations took place under the auspices of Communist military forces. In addition, Communist soldiers helped the peasants organize militia units for the suppression of "bandit activities" and carried out the first stage of the land reform program. Unrest was so prevalent that in some areas land reform had to be delayed until the fall of 1952.[51] Once the land reform program was

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[50] For reference, consult Kung-fei Jo-ho K'ung-chih Nung-ts'un Yü Ch'eng-shih [How the Communists Control Villages and Cities], Taipei 1954, also Nung-ts'un Kung-ch'an-tang-yüan K'o-pen [Textbook for Rural Party Workers], Canton, Hua-nan, 1951.

[51] By the spring of 1952, land reform had been carried out by most of the rural areas. Further delay occurred only in areas occupied (continued next page)

668 under way, membership in the Peasants' Association increased rapidly. For example, during the initial stages of land reform, membership in the Eastern Szechwan Special District rose from 455,990 to 619,000, an increase of 30 per cent.[52] The number of "poor peasants" who entered the associations also increased rapidly. In the Northern Szechwan Special District, "poor peasants" made up 65 per cent of the membership of the peasants' associations and 70 per cent of that of the militia. In addition, they represented 80 per cent of the membership in hsiang governments and militia units.[53]

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668 The militia, an armed force at the disposal of the Party, is an organization of poor peasants, farm laborers, and young people.[54] Prior to the Communist conquest, there were no militia units in Southwest China. Although Communist forces immediately set about building up a militia, only 500,000 recruits had been enrolled by 1950. Central control of the new units was not established

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51. (continued) by national minorities and in some parts of Kweichow. See *New China Daily*, Nov. 21, 1951, p. 2; Sept. 28, 1952, p. 1; May 10, 1952, p. 1; and Oct. 2, 1951, p. 2.

[52] *Ibid.*, Oct. 2, 1951, p. 3.

[53] *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1951, p. 2.

[54] For a study of the militia, see Li Tang, *Militia of Communist China*, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1954.

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701 668 until 1952, following the completion of land reform. At the present time, the militia of Southwest China is far smaller than that of other regions.

The duties of the militia in peace time are to assist the public security forces in matters concerning arrests and detention, co-operate with troops in campaigns against bandits, to guard bridges and transportation centers, and to take charge of food transportation and the maintanence of order at public meetings. In war time, the militia's duty is to co-operate with area commands in district defense.

668 2. Consolidation Period: 1952-53. As land reform came to a close, Communist power was established, but challenged, in the rural areas. Party organizations had not yet been established in many rural areas. Even where they existed, they generally were weak and ineffective. Party indoctrination was neglected, with the result that Party members acted like dictators and Party leaders became confused. In order to remedy this situation, the Party launched its membership drive of 1952 and sought to

strengthen already existent Party organizations.[55]

Together with reports of general apathy was the Wu-to (the "five-too-many") phenomenon. Its name has reference to the practice of permitting an individual to hold a number of different jobs at one time, and it was one of the causes contributing to Party inefficiency in the rural areas. It was reported that in one hsiang in Szechwan, the deputy county chief held more than ten jobs, spent most of his time in meetings, and neglected his official duties.[56] This phenomenon was nationwide and was so serious that the Communists issued directives against it.

At the same time, the Party sought to establish hsiang governments and bring them under its firm control. Various organizations, notably the peasants' associations and other mass organizations, were instructed to select representatives to a hsiang People's Representative Conference. These delegates in turn elected the members of the new hsiang government. The new governments consisted of one

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[55] New China Daily, Aug. 16, 1952, p. 3.
[56] Ibid., June 7, 1953, p. 2.

668 chief, one or two deputy chiefs, and anywhere from nine to eleven committeemen. Administrative organs included commissions on civil affairs, finance, food, education, sanitation, production, militia, and public security.

The Party especially sought to establish closer control over ethnic minorities. First, military forces were used to liquidate "bandits" hiding in the remote mountainous regions inhabited by these minorities. Under the auspices of these forces, schools were organized for the training and indoctrination of political cadres and activists. By December 1952, 65 autonomous area governments and 127 coalition governments had been formed among ethnic minorities in the Southwest.[57] Over 368 trade stations had been established to exploit the economic resources of the region. Acting through 170 purchasing teams, agent of the trade stations scoured these areas for raw materials. to be exported to the Soviet

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[57] See the report of Ho Lung, Deputy Chairman of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee in New China Daily, Dec. 11, 1952, p. 1.

668 Union.[58]

668 666 3. The Election and the Post-Constitution Period:. 1953-1955. Premier Chou En-lai's announcement of a nationwide election in 1953 and the fact that the majority of 280,000 *hsiang* had held all-circle People's conferences indicated the degree of Communist confidence in their power.

At the village and *hsiang* levels, the key task in the period prior to the election was the consolidation and strengthening of the *hsiang* government and the allocation of electoral districts.[59] The *ts'un* (village) lost its status as an administrative unit. Its powers were taken over by the new *hsiang* government. At the same time, delegates to the *hsiang* representative conference were formed into a team for liaison work between the *ts'un* and the *hsiang* government. The jurisdiction of the *hsiang* governments was reduced, in order that they might exert closer control over the population under their authority. Jurisdiction was limited to area within a radius of 30 *li*

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[58] *Ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 2.

[59] See the directive issued by Chang Chi-ch'un in *Ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1951, p. 2.

668 (approximately 10 miles) of the local head-
666 quarters and a population between 500 and 10,000. Ch'ü and county administrations were dealt with in similar fashion. The former was to have not more than 10 hsiang under its jurisdiction and the latter, not more than 10 ch'ü. Finally, electoral delegates were alloted on the basis of hsiang population.

668 After the promulgation of the Constitution, Communist political power was further strengthened. The hsiang People's congress now holds the highest formal authority in the locality, but the true power remains with the hsiang People's council. Resistance remains strong in the rural areas, however, and in 1955, two strong countermeasures were passed by
474 the Party.[60] Further expansion of agricultural
668 producers' co-operatives was temporarily checked, and the first Rural Basic-Level Organization Conference was held in April 1955 for the purpose of strengthening Party

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[60] "Wei-shen-ma Pi-hsü Chung-shih Nung-yeh Sheng-ch'an Ho-tso-she Ti Kung-ku Kung-tso?" ["Why Should Productive Co-operatives Be Strengthened?"], New China Monthly, March 1955, pp. 133-134.

474 668 leadership over the agricultural producers' co-operative organization before gradual collectivization began.

The following resolutions were adopted at the Conference:[61] (1) Party organization shall be based on territorial and production units, with emphasis on the development of more Party branches in the agricultural producers' co-operatives. (2) Collective work rather than individual achievement is to be stressed. (3) There is to be further expansion of Party indoctrination programs. (4) The county Party secretary's leadership and the Party's political role in the producers' co-operatives is to be strengthened.

The chief problems which the agricultural program of the Party faces are the need for cadre education, the lack of Party strength, and the peasant's sense of individuality and love of his own land.

369 668 D. Political Control in the City

The establishment and consolidation of

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[61] Summary report on the conference in New China Monthly, No. 4, April 1955, pp. 27-28.

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369 668 Communist power in the cities followed the same general course as in the rural areas. The Democratic Construction Movement, directed in particular at the urban population and the trade unions, and the violent Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, directed at the Party itself, the government administration, and industrial and business circles of society, in effect, performed functions similar to those in the land reform in rural areas.

668 Communist power in the city is retained through the maintenance of a set of control organizations, extending from workers' trade unions to the students' federation.[62]

The Urban Inhabitants' Committee, composed of one-hundred to six-hundred families, is organized with the stated aim of contributing to the welfare of the residents. The basic unit is a family residing in or sharing a house with others. Under the committee are sub-committees representing

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[62] Regulation of committees, People's Daily, Dec. 31, 1954, p. 1-2. English text in Current Background, No. 310, Jan. 17, 1955.

668 fifteen to forty families. Minority nationality groups and workers' residential areas are organized in similar units. It is reported that more than 70 per cent of the cities in China are under the control of these organizations.

The Urban Street Office is a representative of the city government and acts as a liaison between the government and the street for the maintenance of public order. Its jurisdiction parallels that established for the Public Security Sub-Station, thus enforcing a double-check on residents. The Public Security Sub-Station is responsible, in the main, for the maintenance of public order and the suppression of counterrevolutionaries.

The Mediation Committee is a mass organization established both in the city and in the village.[63] Its function is to mediate disputes and to propagandize government statutes, and, provisionally, to exercise "judicial" power in the village or street for misdemeanors not under the jurisdiction of the People's tribunal. Although the committee acts as a third party in a dispute, it represents

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[63] People's Daily, March 23, 1954, p. 1.

668 the government's view and emphasizes the technique of self-criticism.

Communist control in the city is much more rigid and forceful than in the village. With the spread of Communist domination over many organizations, factories, and other professional organizations, Communist domination is strengthened. Although public security sub-stations play a leading role in enforcing government decrees, the importance of other organizations, notably the procuratorates and the People's courts, should not be minimized.

III. ELECTIONS AND POLITICS OF MINOR PARTIES

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A. Elections

The nationwide election which produced the People's congresses at all levels was held in the Southwest between 1953 and July-August, 1954.

1. Election Mechanism. The Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China was

665 666 208 Fifty nine thousand election handbooks were distributed by some 180,000 specially trained propagandists, many of them members of the Szechwan Federation of Literature and Art Circles. Among other devices used were 34 mobile motion picture projection teams, 400 slide-projector units, innumerable "cultural" exhibits, and periodic radio 665 668 broadcasts. Election personnel were chosen from various Party, governmental, and mass organizations. Students also were widely used. For example, in Kweichow some 400 students of political science and law, together with several hundred graduates of the Provincial Institue of Nationalists, served as election officers.[67]

The result of the election was a foregone conclusion. In all provinces, between one-fourth and one-third of the deputies elected to the Provincial People's Congresses were members of the Communist Party.[68] Most non-Party deputies enthusiastically supported the Party's program. It would seem that, like most elections in Communist states, the general elections of 1953 and 1954 were

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67. Ibid., May 19, 1953, p. 3.

68. People's Daily, March 21, 1954, p. 3; also April 28, 1954, p. 3.

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665 666 promulgation of the Constitution in September 1954, the establishment of these committees in administrative districts, cities, and counties was encouraged. The new Constitution only allows for the establishment of these committees in provinces and in municipalities directly under the central authority.

With the consolidation of Communist political power at all levels, the position of minor parties is further endangered. For instance, the liquidation of capitalists in the transitional stage certainly will reduce the power of the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy. Eventually, minor parties no longer will exist as political forces in the ordinary sense of the term, simply because they no longer will exert political influence.

665 668 1. Control and Infiltration of Minor Parties. The most effective way of eliminating minor parties and their activities is to exercise strict control over them, either through direct subjugation or infiltration. The guiding principles to be observed by all minor parties participating in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

665 indicates the degree to which these minor
668 parties have subordinated themselves to the Communist Party of China. Minor parties "must assist the state organs and set the social forces in motion ... to maintain close contact with the masses ... to continue to consolidate and develop the alliance between China and the U.S.S.R. .... and to study Marxist-Leninist theories on a voluntary basis, study state policy, elevate political levels, practice self-criticism and criticism, and strive for ideological remolding."

The Communist Party relies chiefly on infiltration to eliminate minor parties. Through the Party Committee's Department of the United Front, the Party maintains a close control over the policies and activities of the minor parties. Often it virtually dictates their policies. For example, the resolution on party expansion adopted by the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party in December 1951 authorized the appointment of Communist Party members to high posts within the organization. In addition, it forbade the establishment of party units in the countryside and excluded party activists from such organizations as the People's Liberation Army, the public security agencies, and intelligence units.

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665 2. Minor Parties and "Pressure Politics." In a democracy, the political
668 activity of minor or opposition parties may indicate the measure of effective democracy. Likewise, special interest groups, as such, can enjoy their political privileges under democratic rule. In Communist China, since public opinion is controlled by the Communist Party, and since the minor parties have only assigned duties to perform, special interest groups and the dissident parties exert no "pressure" upon the state organizations dominated by the Party nor do they take part in the making of decisions.

Deputies of the minor parties were allowed to make speeches at the All-People's Conferences, but they limited themselves to priase, criticizing only those minor faults which the Communists themselves had admitted publicly.

Finally, with the retirement of aging leaders whose authority dates from the pre-Communist period, and with the absence of young and vigorous new members, the value of the minor parties is in rapid decline.

CONCLUSION

665 Since 1952 both the size and the influence of the Communist Party have increased

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Even after the Communists consolidated

● 668 their hold on Southwest China, open and clandestine opposition of all kinds was reported by the new regime. Two main sources of subversion were marked as targets for destruction by the government: (1) "Counterrevolutionaries" or "basically hostile elements" -- inclusive terms embracing all social, economic, and political elements considered enemies of the socialist state. (2) Harmful activities such as corruption, waste, and theft which are reported to have caused degeneration and inefficiency in Party and government organizations, industrial

578 establishments, and rural co-operatives. A third source of danger to the Communist regime -- tension and discontent within the party, government, and the populace -- can be inferred as concommitants of excessive control by an extremely centralized state, though little explicit reference is made to such feelings by the regime.[2]

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[2] Studies of the USSR can be helpful in understanding this subject. Cf. Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1955; Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress USSR, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.

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669 Yunnan's border with Burma and within ethnic minority areas of the province. In December 1952, the Communists announced the capture of the last Nationalist stronghold inside Yunnan and the annihilation of 21,573 Nationalist soldiers and intelligence agents. However, the presence of Kuomintang forces under Li Mi and Yü Ch'eng-wan across the Yunnan border in Burma constituted a continuous threat to the province's security until they were withdrawn to Formosa in late 1954.

In Sikang, the "bandit-suppression" campaign was on a much smaller scale.[7] It lasted from February to November of 1950 and was reported to have destroyed 30,000 "bandits."

B. Landlords

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668 Under the Land Reform Law and the joint directive of the Government Administration Council and the People's Supreme Court,

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[7] Compendium of Government Reports, 1950, pp. 1071-73.

565 landlords were convicted of a variety of crimes 668 during the Land Reform Movement. Punishment ranged from death to short terms of imprisonment. After release from prison, landlords were given a small piece of land to work and placed under the surveillance of public security agencies or were required to [697] serve in forced-labor camps. During and after the Land Reform Movement, forced-labor units were established throughout the Southwest Region, and nearly every county maintained a forced-labor battalion.[8] These battalions were engaged in all types of construction from the building and repairing of roads in ethnic minority areas to the extraction of minerals in mining areas. Still other landlords were classified as counterrevolutionaries within the meaning of the term as used in the Decree on the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries issued by the Ministry of Public Security of the Government Administration Council[9] in Feb. 1951. They

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[8] For example, see report on the province of Kweichow, New China Daily, Oct. 8, 1951, p. 1.

[9] Text of the regulation in People's Daily, Feb. 22, 1951, p. 1.

565-668 were deprived of their political rights and subject to surveillance for at least three years as well as being made liable to forced labor at any time and in any place they were needed.

A new type of "potential landlord," regarded by the Communists as hostile to the new regime, came into existence after land reform. This "new rich" group was composed of Party members and former middle peasants who had acquired wealth following the redistribution of land. Since 1953, they have been accused of such hostile acts against the state as seizing control of rural governments, destroying agricultural producers' co-operatives, and disrupting Communist political control in rural areas. Cases of these kinds have been reported everywhere.[10] (See section on Rural Security in chapter on Public Order and Safety.) According to Communist accounts, the "new rich" group destroyed rural co-operatives by bribing Party cadres and responsible persons in the organizations or by employing collaborator

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[10] For an early report see New China Daily, Oct. 9, 1952; for more recent accounts see the reports of deputies to the National People's Congress, People's Daily, July 29, 1955, pp. 5, 6; and July 31, 1955, p. 3.

565 to infilitrate and capture key positions. Through
568 these agents, the "potential landlords" spread rumors among the peasants, falsified co-operative accounts, and engaged in other disruptive maneuvers to disorganize the co-operatives' work and membership.

C. Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries and Espionage Agents

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687 As early as July 1950, the Government Administration Council of the Central Government and the People's Supreme Court issued a joint directive calling for the suppression of all counterrevolutionaries throughout China. The directive demanded the apprehension and severe punishment of organizers of open resistance, saboteurs in factories and warehouses, and murders of government officials. Nationalist intelligence agents and "bandit leaders" were particularly singled out for elimination. However, not until the nationwide Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in 1951 did the campaign against subversiv^es reach major proportions and involve mass participation. At the conclusion of the movement, the foundation had been laid for the construction of a network of mass security organizations.

668 1. Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement of 1951. Like other mass movements

● 668 initiated by the Communists, the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement of 1951 relied heavily on techniques for arrousing mass hysteria. The people were drawn into mass meetings to be bombarded with propaganda. With mass fear and emotion aroused, the populace was led to make accusations in public and in private and to sign patriotic agreements. The campaign was carried on in factories, schools, and other organizations. Finally, security committees were established in every organization, street, and village, so that a public security network reached into every sector of social, economic, and political life. In Chungking, for example, four area-security committees, 90 branch-security committees, and 1,211 security teams were set up between June and September 1951. The membership of the committees was overwhelmingly made up of workers' representatives.[11]

Throughout the movement, cases of subversion and espionage were deliberately manufactured or exaggerated by the Communists, This deceptive practice seems

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[11] New China Daily, Oct. 7, 1951, p. 1.

668 to have been a convenient means of absolving the regime of responsibility for any of its failures. In the Southwest Region, 5,168 cases of counterrevolutionary activity were reported during the movement, and 70 per cent of them were described as involving open resistance.[12] Their crimes were reported to have included the murder of 14,000 government workers and activists, the poisoning of 6,000 others, and the destruction or theft of several billion yuan worth of crops and other property.

Toward the end of the movement, its general success was praised in a spate of reports. At the same time, the Communist press noted failures, stressed the need for continuing vigilence, and issued warnings to particular areaswhere the movement had not been carried out successfully or had been completely ignored. In the Fu-ling Administrative District of Szechwan, for instance, only 34 per cent of the hsiang were credited with having done an adequate job in ferreting out counterrevolutionaries. Chou Hsing, head of the Department of Public Security of the Southwest China regional government, pointed out that the enemies of the regime had not

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12. *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1951, p. 2.

• 668 been entirely eliminated. He called for continued efforts to detect and suppress Nationalist intelligence agents, "bandits," and landlords, and for concentration on the strengthening of the "democratic reform movement" and the establishment of public security committees.

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2. Suppression of Nationalist Spies.

669 The threat of Nationalist expionage in Southwest China was greatest at the time the Communists assumed power in the region. The Communists not only reported 80,000 Nationalist intelligence workers at large in the region, but also claimed their influence and operations extended to the remnants of Nationalist forces, "bandit" units, and secret societies in Southwest China. Great emphasis was placed on the necessity of ridding the region of these spies to assure the well being of the new regime.

During 1950, the Communists concentrated on the disbanding of Nationalist espionage organizations and obtaining the surrender and arrest of spies. In the western Szechwan special district, the Communist authorities reported the surrender of 2,000 spies and the arrest of 318 others in the first half of 1950. During the same period in the southern Szechwan special district, 726 669 apparently were intended to convince the people that spying by Nationalist agents still constituted an actual threat to the Communist regime. Indeed, it may be that espionage organizations had been revitalized by internal or external forces.

726 668 798 3. Foreign "Intelligence Agents." Closely connected with the suppression of Kuomintang intelligence personnel on the Mainland was the apprehension of "foreign intelligence agents." During the 1951 suppression movement, church groups and foreign missionaries were accused of engaging in espionage against the regime. Arrests of missionaries and foreign residents were frequently reported throughout the Southwest Region. A Catholic organization, Sheng-mu Chün (Legion of Mary), was made a particular object of attack. Members of the organization were required to register with the authorities and were subject to investigation by public security agencies. Persons who failed to comply were arrested and charged with counterrevolutionary activity.

687 4. Sabotage. Acts of sabotage reported in the Communist press included the destruction of factory property, the theft of economic information, the spreading of rumors among workers, and the organization of strikes.

[redacted]

575 memberships dissolved, the Communists invaded and controlled the societies' former areas of strength. This move was largely accomplished through the "democratic reform movement,"[22] which involved mass participation in public meetings, at which evidence of crimes committed by the societies was displayed and people were urged to reveal knowledge of the societies' membership and activities. Another part of the movement consisted of a concentrated attack upon all labor organizations suspected of being under the influence or control of secret socieites. Some of them had acquired leadership of labor groups in charge of wharves, railway, stations, and wheelbarrow "transportation centers." To eliminate the power of the societies, the Communists introduced a campaign to reorganize small transport firms into state-owned companies and to organize workers into Communist trade unions under the disciplined management of Party cadres.

II. CORRUPTION, WASTE, AND THEFT

A. The Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns

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668 In December 1951, the Communists

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[22] New China Daily, Oct. 14, 1951, p. 2; Nov. 29, 1951, p. 1; July 24, 1952, p. 2.

661 launched the Three-Anti Campaign against
668 waste, corruption, and bureaucracy; a few months later the regime initiated the Five-Anti Campaign against bribery of government personnel, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and the purchase of economic information. These campaigns did more than affirm the Communists' determination to eliminate corruption and the most common causes of "degeneration" within the Party, state organizations, public enterprises, and private business firms; the drives also enabled the Communist leadership to tighten its grip on private enterprise, heighten discipline throughout the Party and public organizations, and exert closer surveillance and control over the whole state apparatus. The Three-Anti Campaign was directed at administrative and Party personnel, and the Five-Anti Campaign at merchants and industrialists. Since Party members were, in most cases, administrative officers, the first campaign hit Party and administrative personnel from two sides and since state-operated enterprises and administrative organizations were involved with private business, the attack upon business also was felt by administrators and Party members.

B. Corruption

661 Most of the charges and disclosures
685 that accompanied the progress of the Three-Anti

661 687 and Five-Anti campaigns. Some of the cases undoubtedly involved conscious attempts to defraud the government or misuse public office, but others probably arose out of unintentional errors and mistakes. It seems apparent also, that many firms and individuals were innocent victims of the Communist regime's attempt to take over private industry, tighten discipline within Party ranks, find scapegoats for the Party's errors, and establish firmer control over the people generally.

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III. TENSION AND PUBLIC DISCONTENT

Public discontent and tension are invariably the result of excessive centralization of government and strict regimentation of the populace in any state. The Communist regime in China has not only regulated and restricted the people through Party, state, and mass organizations, but also has imposed on the population terror, high taxation, and extensive public obligations. Despite the attempts of the Communists to seek popular support and persuade the people to believe in a brighter future, both discontent and tension in China today cannot be overlooked or minimized.

Popular unrest is inferred in the frequency, intensity, and nature of such programs as the Suppression-of-Counter-revolutionaries Movement and the Three-Anti

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668 and Five-Anti campaigns. Other signs are apparent in press references during the past few years to the deleterious effects on the health and efficiency of the people in forcing them to over-extend their energies in work or study and to sacrifice all their free time to participation in indoctrination programs and propaganda drives. Still another clue to domestic unrest may be detected in the regime's admission of popular resistance to implementation of the Marriage Law and the consequent necessity of making the reorientation of marriage and family practices a long-term and continuing task. From such evidences of restiveness in the population and from our knowledge of human reaction to excessive regimentation, the causes and pattern of public discontent and tension can be treated with some accuracy.

A. Public Discontent

1. Regimentation and Restriction.

The Communists' regimentation of the people and all their activities is a primary cause of resistance and discontent among the populace. The establishment of agricultural producers' co-operatives in the rural districts and the organization of all workers into unions are notable examples of attempts to achieve complete control.

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The restrictions resulting from regimentation cause great inconvenience. However, the demand that spare-time be devoted entirely to various Party-inspired activities and duties is even more objectionable. Peasants are required to attend meetings, go to winter schools, keep advised of all farm matters, and perform various other duties depending upon the sex and age of the individual. Even how the farmer spends his money is circumscribed by Party counseling. Advise on the disposition of his excess cash is imparted by a Party member in a series of interviews heavily spiked with propaganda. The process is not only time-consuming, but also trying on the collective patience of the peasants.

City dwellers are forced to accept similar restrictions. On the job, workers are required to observe "labor discipline." They are severely punished for tardiness or for leaving the factory early. Loafing and belligerence are punishable crimes. During off-hours, workers are required to participate in all organizational and cultural activities and to attend technical and cultural classes. Participation in mass meetings, propaganda discussion groups, and urban community committees is expected. Almost no time is left for taking care of private affairs.

2. High Taxation and Public Obligation.

651 The high taxes and business restrictions

constantly patrolled, and each village near the
651/ right-of-way must maintain a specially
701/ organized force for this purpose and participate in the guard duty for a 72-hour period every month.[40] In addition, the village maintains a militia in which all the young residents must serve. Besides training or participating in the unit's cultural and indoctrination activities, the militia patrols key areas in the village, guards government grain, helps in loading it for shipment, and assists in keeping the village free of bandits. Misuse of the militia by the Southwest China Military Command in 1953 was criticized as having wasted 24,700 man-hours per day.[41]

Similar public and military services are required of city dwellers. They must engage in military training, participate in the local military unit's cultural and organizational activities, and serve on patrols in their own or neighboring areas whenever needed.

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Controls imposed upon the people by
208 security agencies and other organizations

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[40] Ibid., Nov. 11, 1951, p. 4.

[41] Report of the Second Southwest China Militia Conference, Ibid., May 20, 1953, p.1.

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208 have been frequent causes of public discontent. The large-scale rationing program enforced in the cities and the constant investigations conducted by public security agencies cause a great deal of anger, if not outbreaks of violence. To some extent, at least, the Communists recognize the limits of public inconvenience and dissatisfaction. The regime seeks to offset disaffection by emphasizing in its propaganda the necessity and patriotism of individual sacrifice for the national welfare. If some non-vital aspect of the Communist program occasions bitter and widespread complaint, the regime bends to public opinion and institutes changes. Wherever possible, the Communists attempt to avoid the flagrant use of threats and force in approaching and controlling the public. Nevertheless, the regime has been far from successful in preventing public discontent.

B. Tension within Organizations

578 The use of various overlapping control agencies to supervise and ensure the execution of Party directive has created suspicion and tension within the control agencies themselves and the supervised state, Party,

665 578 Party members cannot escape the endless program of Party indoctrination and rectification. The dual pressures and resulting tension are in large part responsible for the high rate of expulsion and resignation from the Party. Many people who are outwardly in favor of the regime are reluctant to join the Party. The fate of former Parry members after expulsion or resignation is not known, but they are undoubtedly confined in prisons or forced labor camps for some period of time. If allowed to remain free or when released, ex-members are probably subject to security surveillance. However, they may in time form a new subversive group.

668 578 Tension also exists in mass organizations as the result of pressure imposed upon them by the Party and higher organizations. The broadest and also the most unstable mass organizations are the Democratic Youth Corps and the All-China Federation of Democratic Women. Lacking a common political, economic, or community base, these organizations are composed of heterogeneous social and political elements, directly or indirectly coerced into membership. These group must be handled carefully. The key to preventing tensions within an organization from

668 expanding beyond safe limits seems to lie in
578 constant vigilance and an incessant barrage of propaganda. By instituting stricter controls and by disposing of undesirable members, the regime has sought to keep these organizations in the service of the Party.

CONCLUSION

Subversive potentialities cannot be eliminated however effective a dictatorship or tyranny may be. The forces in opposition to Communist rule in Southwest China are the victims of power, the traditional resistance groups, and discontented ex-members of the Communist Party.

The victims of Communist power -- landlords, former Kuomintang officials, and other elements which have been named by the Communists as "counterrevolutionaries" -- constitute the most threatening opposition to the current regime. Most of the former Nationalist forces have been eliminated, imprisoned, or placed under surveillance, but some of them may still remain at large. Because of past experience, any officials of the former regime still operating in the

578 Southwest Region are in the best position to
668 assume leadership over all resistance groups. Potential additions to the subversive elements in the region are present in the peasants opposed to collectivization and the "new rich" group, classed as hostile by the regime.

The operation of traditional resistance groups is manifest in the continued activities of the secret societies. Because they are attractive to illiterate peasants and laborers, the regime may find itself in the curious position of having to eliminate considerable numbers of the proletariat and peasantry, whose interests the Communists claim to protect and advance.

Too little is known of the fate and activities of the former Communist Party members in China to be able to speculate on their subversive potentialities. However, it seems certain that the chances for opposition by this group and its possible strength and cohesion will vary inversely with the success, power, and unity of the Chinese Communist Party.

Public discontent and tension within organizations in the Southwest Region are by no means indications of the impending collapse

578 of the Communist regime. Rather, they
668 are the reactions to be expected from a controlled society under a tight dictatorship. Tension and public discontent would have to develop in intensity and proportion far beyond their current manifestations before the regime would be weakened or seriously handicapped, and the loss of Party morale and unity would have to extend far beyond its present level before the entire Communist system was threatened with disruption.

and the labor bureau, to a cut in wages of from 40 to 60 per cent to help tide the capitalists over a difficult period.[8] 468

On the basis of experience in settling labor disputes, the Ministry of Labor in April 1950 issued a "Directive Concerning the Establishment of Labor-Capital Consultative Councils in Privately Owned Enterprises." In accordance with the directive, 34 different groups of private enterprises in Chungking formed their labor-capital consultative councils between mid-1950 and mid-1951. Labor and capital were equally represented on the council. During the period, consultations between labor and capital in various Chungking enterprises resulted in 2,224 agreements which were submitted to the labor bureau for ratification. Almost without exception, matters brought up in the councils for consultation were concerned with wages and the discharges of workers.[9]

III. POLITICIAL INDOCTRINATION

The Communists insist that the strength and class consciousness of the workers can only grow out of political indoctrination. In the guise of implementing this dogma, the Communists initiated the "Democratic Reform" Movement among the working class in May 1951, followed by the Resist-America-Aid Korea Movement, the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement as well as the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. Through 467 668

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[8] Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao [Compendium of Government Reports], Peking, 1951, p. 1013; Workers' Daily, June 21,1950,p.1.

[9] New China Daily, Oct.10,1951,p.2.

467 these drives, the Communists claim that trade
668 union organization was greatly expanded throughout the nation and the unity of the working class increased.

The "Democratic Reform" Movement was aimed specifically at the elimination of reactionary elements from labor organizations. Launched in Central-South China in May 1951, the movement was extended to the whole country in the following months. Its centers of action were the public and private factories, mind, and transportation systems.

To initiate "Democratic Reform" in any enterprise, the trade union leaders called meetings, at which everyone was free to make complaints or accusations against workers, union cadres, or managers. Once initiated, the campaign continued for days or weeks. In subsequent meetings, criticism and self-criticism were encouraged. The Communists claimed that many reactionary elements were disclosed this way. Within the transportation industry alone, 15,616 gang labor chiefs were said to have been eliminated throughout the country a few months after the movement started.[10]

The Communists claim that the conditions of construction workers at Ta-tu-k'ou and coal miners at the T'ien-fu mine, both in Chungking, were improved after the "Democratic Reform"

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[10] Current Background, Hong Kong, U.S. Consulate General, Oct. 15, 1951, No. 128.

467 668 Movement was initiated there in mid-1951. Prior to the Communist regime, the system of recruitment in contruction work and in the mining industry was known as the gang master system. The gang master made a contract with the head engineer or manager of a company to supply labor for certain jobs at a stipulated price. He employed villagers for low wages and pocketed the difference between his payroll and the contract price. According to the Communist press, when the Red Army took Chungking at the end of 1949, the gang labor chiefs infiltrated the labor organization and some of them even pretended to be activists. The Communists assert that in the criticism and self-criticism meetings these gang labor chiefs were discovered and eliminated from the labor organization in Chungking.[11]

IV. LABOR EMULATION AND PRODUCTION

466 461 Labor emulation is a Communist method for increasing labor productivity without raising production costs. It was practiced in Communist China during the early 1940's in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region.[12] Extended to all China in 1950, the labor emulation drive was stepped up in 1951 after the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War. According to the

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11. New China Daily, Oct. 10, 12, 14, 1951; and Oct. 2, 1952, p. 2.

12. Abundant Clothing; Sufficient Food, Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, May 1944.

575 people apart, this source of inspiration has likewise vanished. Ideals of filial piety and of veneration for older persons, though still observed, have lost much of their former appeal as a result of the war and the infiltration of Western thought. On the other hand, *yi* and brotherhood, which are at the core of all Ko Lao Hui activities—particularly those involving social insurance and security—have not only remained cardinal principles of the society but are being observed with greater zeal than ever, largely because the security of the people is increasingly threatened by the present system of government.

575 198 A prominent characteristic of any secret society is the use of a special terminology by its members. For various reasons—to distinguish members from non-members, to permit members to outwit government authorities, etc.—a secret society, especially in the early stages of development, finds it convenient to designate terms of its own making which differ sufficiently from common usage to enable members to communicate with one another without being understood by the uninitiate. At present, however, the Ko Lao Hui has come so far into the open that nearly everyone knows of its existence and may join it if he so desires. Since most of its activities are common knowledge, there is no longer a need for a secret language with which to conceal them. Instead, a number of new terms have been introduced into Ko Lao Hui parlance, indicating a certain adaptation to changing conditions of society.

575 565 The progressive relaxation of entrance requirements to a point where almost anyone may join has made for marked local dissimilarities. The wholesale entrance into the Ko Lao Hui of local warlords, retired politicians, corrupt government officials and demobilized soldiers, few of whom are interested primarily in the social aims of the society, is causing the society to engage in an increasing number of undesirable activities while at the same time encouraging the tendency toward separatism among the branches. To a Ko Lao Hui member of the old school, such a trend represents degeneration which must result ultimately in complete separation and dissolution.

575 668 On the other hand, it is clear that the Ko Lao Hui will retain its power until something can be found to replace it. The government, though well aware of the growing power and influence of the society, has done little to combat it beyond occasionally voicing expressions of alarm. Government officials have been forbidden to join the society, and

students in government schools have been threatened with expulsion if they become members. But one may question the efficacy of a policy which ignores a manifestation of this kind while permitting it to grow stronger. Surely, it would be better to investigate the Ko Lao Hui—to discover why it exists, how it operates and what are its effects—and then to seek means of reforming it, of converting it into an effective force for improving the welfare of the people. For the *basic* principles of the Ko Lao Hui are not anti-social. And if the political situation in the province remains chaotic; if corruption in government continues; if unemployment, especially of demobilized soldiers, is not combated; if popular education remains completely inadequate; and if some sort of social insurance is not provided in the present period of rehabilitation; then, the people will certainly continue to look to the Ko Lao Hui for protection and for a livelihood.

Chengtu, Szechuan, 1946